| 1997 | Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory |
| p.306 | p.306 | 10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place |
| Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306) | |||
| A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there? |
| p.306 | p.306 | 10198 | If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible |
| Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306) | |||
| A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event? |
| p.307 | p.307 | 10199 | Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts |
| Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307) | |||
| A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts. |
| 2008 | The Privileged Present: A-Theory |
| 2 | p.212 | 14608 | A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future |
| Full Idea: To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2) | |||
| A reaction: The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity). |
| 3 | p.214 | 14610 | Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past |
| Full Idea: Neither the 'moving spotlight' nor the 'growing block' view of A-theory time can explain why we care so much about whether things (such as a headache) are present or past. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 3) | |||
| A reaction: He goes on the defend Presentism as the best version of the A-series view. You can't deny that the past is more of a 'truthmaker' than the future, so it seems to have a firmer ontological status. Deeply weird. |