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Ideas of Boethius, by Text

[Roman, 480 - 524, Born in Rome. Taught by Symmachus. Spent much of later life in prison. Died at Pavia.]

516 Librium de interpretatione editio secunda
PL64 462d p.111 We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses
517 Second Commentary on 'Isagoge'
p.49 If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction
518 Concerning the Trinity
Ch. 4 p.242 There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things
520 The Consolations of Philosophy
I.IV p.44 Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't?
I.VI p.50 The regular events of this life could never be due to chance
II.VI p.70 You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions
III.I p.79 Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired
III.X p.101 God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God
III.XI p.104 God is the good
III.XI p.105 Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify
III.XII p.110 The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God'
III.XII p.112 God can do anthing, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing
IV.II p.119 The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it
IV.II p.120 The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural
IV.III p.124 The reward of the good is to become gods
IV.III p.125 When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature
IV.VI p.141 If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere
V.6 p.376 Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life
V.II p.149 Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement
V.III p.150 God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will
V.III p.151 Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge?
V.III p.153 Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind
V.IV p.156 Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different