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Ideas of Sextus Empiricus, by Text

[Greek, 140 - 200, Probably a doctor.]

180 Against the Professors
11.8 p.180 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'
7.158 p.451 Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification
7.95 p.102 The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature'
8.331a p.249 How can you investigate without some preconception of your object?
8.74 p.203 It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely
180 Outlines of Pyrrhonism
I.101 p.46 Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin
I.103 p.46 Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight
I.109 p.48 Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk
I.119 p.51 The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it
I.12 p.19 The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition
I.120 p.51 The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing
I.20 p.22 Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance
I.32 p.26 The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand
I.47 p.30 If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape
I.59 p.33 How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved?
I.80 p.39 If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions
I.96 p.44 If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities
II.109 p.132 If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together
II.110 p.132 A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood'
II.135 p.141 Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference
II.204 p.164 If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction
II.215 p.168 You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original
II.252 p.182 If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument
II.258 p.184 We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful
II.75 p.120 How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects?
III.111 p.226 Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die
III.14 p.191 Some say that causes are physical, some say not
III.141 p.236 If motion and rest are abolished, so is time
III.142 p.236 Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist
III.143 p.236 How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another?
III.15 p.191 Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly
III.18 p.193 If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything
III.203 p.257 With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble
III.21 p.193 Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular
III.234 p.267 Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree
III.27 p.196 Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist
III.3 p.187 How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place?
III.6 p.188 The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration
III.68 p.212 Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front?
III.76 p.215 If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin
III.77 p.215 If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity
III.9 p.189 If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things?