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Ideas of Thomas Aquinas, by Text

[Italian, 1225 - 1274, Born Roccasecca, Italy. Dominican monk. Taught by Albertus Magnus. Based Paris, then Italy. Died at Fossanova. 'Doctor Angelicus'.]

1264 Sentences
IV.13.2.3sc p.433 Heretics should be eradicated like wolves
1265 Summa Theologicae
p.20 Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Martin/Barresi]
p.117 Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [MacIntyre]
p.198 Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Zagzebski]
p.573 If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant]
1a 18.2c p.324 Bodies are three-dimensional substances
1a 76.4c p.575 Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them
Art 3 p.31 The fool in Psalm 52 seems to conceive of God's non-existence, so His existence can't be self-evident [PG]
Art 3 p.32 God's existence may be self-evident in itself, but it is not self-evident to limited human beings [PG]
Ch.5 85.1 p.133 We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities
Ch.5 85.1 p.133 Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance
Ch.5 85.1 p.133 Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied
Ch.5 85.1 p.134 Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general
Ch.5 85.1 p.134 The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding
Ch.5 85.1 p.134 The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species
Ch.5 85.2 p.135 Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present
Ch.5 85.2 p.136 Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them
I q11 ar2 ad4 p.36 Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude
I-II q56 a5 obj3 p.277 Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason
III Supp 94/1 p.49 Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished
No 3 p.83 First Way: movement is impossible without a First Mover [PG]
No 3 p.83 Second Way: everything has a cause, and this can't go back to infinity, so there is a First Cause [PG]
No 3 p.84 Third Way: if everything was contingent it would all have vanished by now, and it hasn't, so something must be necessary [PG]
No 3 p.84 Fourth Way: qualities with gradations (like goodness) depend on a maximum for that quality, so there is a supreme being [PG]
No 3 p.85 If nature and human will explain everything that happens, only God can explain those things [PG]
No 3 p.85 Fifth Way: everything acts ignorantly to some end, so an intelligence must provide the end [PG]
No 3 p.85 Evil must be tolerated, because it allows God to bring good out of evil, which is a supreme good [PG]
Pt II p.211 For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Grayling]
Q. 110 p.239 Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Tuckness/Wolf]
Q85 1 Ad 1 p.159 Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately
Q85 1 Ad 1 p.159 We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature
Q85 1 Reply p.158 We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things
Q85 Ad2 p.160 Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities
Q85 Ad2 p.160 Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter
Q85 Ad4 p.161 Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions
Q85 Art2 p.162 Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species
1266 On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'
V.9.890 p.230 Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being
1267 Quodlibeta
IX.2.2 p.184 Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white
1268 Summa Contra Gentiles
I.66 p.27 Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference
III.67 p.42 Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything
1269 Quaestiones de Potentia Dei
q3 a16 ad 3-um p. 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number
1269 Quaestiones de anima
11c p.578 One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them
1270 De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)
p.196 The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
23 p.17 If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
p.100 p.100 If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato
p.102 p.102 The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world
p.103 p.103 A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause
p.103 p.103 A simple substance is its own essence
p.92 p.92 Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories
p.92 p.92 Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence
p.92 p.92 If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent
p.92 p.92 The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things
p.92 p.92 Definition of essence makes things understandable
p.93 p.93 Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject
p.93 p.93 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form
p.94 p.94 It is by having essence that things exist
p.95 p.95 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form
1271 Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo
Q6.06 p.172 The will can only want what it thinks is good
Q6.07 p.173 The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means
Q6.10 p.173 We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence
Q6.h to 05 p.181 Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable
Q6.h to 07 p.181 We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it
Q6.h to 12 p.182 The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths
Q6.h to 15 p.182 Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process
Q6.h to 18 p.182 Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge
Q6.h to 21 p.183 The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it
Q6.h to 24 p.183 However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit
Q6.reply p.176 Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming
Q6.reply p.177 Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind
Q6.reply p.177 For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many
Q6.reply p.178 We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will
Q6.reply p.178 Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will
Q6.reply p.179 If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it
Q6.x2 p.175 Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them
1272 Super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli
p.192 If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do