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Ideas of George Berkeley, by Text

[Irish, 1684 - 1753, Born at Kilkenny. Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland. Died in Oxford.]

1710 The Principles of Human Knowledge
p.19 Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
p.33 Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism
p.118 Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are
1 p.65 Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
2 p.65 Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self
3 p.66 The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds
3 p.66 Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
7 p.68 The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives
10 p.69 No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities
14 p.71 Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold
14 p.71 Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion
17 p.72 Material substance is just general existence which can have properties
31 p.79 We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections
50 p.89 No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy
90 p.110 When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind
98 p.113 I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind
Intro 15 p.55 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
Intro 7 p.47 The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects
102 p.115 If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature
112 p.121 All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
145 p.139 I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects
153 p.144 Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings
10 p.49 I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas
33 p.79 The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience
Intro 11 p.51 If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason
Intro 18 p.58 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
Intro 19 p.58 Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas
Intro 21 p.60 Abstract ideas are impossible
Intro 22 p.61 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
Intro 24 p.62 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
n 49 p.65 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
1713 Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous
p. 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects
p.22 Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended
p.25 For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's
p.70 Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations
p.167 Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things
I p.150 p.150 There is no such thing as 'material substance'
I p.154 p.154 Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities
I p.158 p.158 A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water
I p.169 p.169 Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities
I p.170 p.170 A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny
I p.171 p.171 The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object
I p.172 p.172 Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds
I p.173 p.173 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses
I p.176 p.176 Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual
I p.184 p.184 I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind
I p.186 p.186 Distance is not directly perceived by sight
II p.198 p.198 It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness
II p.198 p.198 There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him
II p.203 p.203 How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?
II p.205 p.205 I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it
II p.208 p.208 If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception?
II p.209 p.209 It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed.
II p.212 p.212 There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it
II p.214 p.214 A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition
III p.220 p.220 Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind
III p.220 p.220 Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own
III p.222 p.222 There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent
III p.224 p.224 I know that nothing inconsistent can exist
III p.225 p.225 Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter
III p.227 p.227 Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law
III p.227 p.227 If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events
III p.228 p.228 People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God
III p.237 p.237 Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves
III p.239 p.239 Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies
III p.257 p.257 There is no other substance in a strict sense, than spirit
1734 The Analyst
p.96 Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities