| 1710 | The Principles of Human Knowledge |
| p.19 | 6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought |
| p.33 | 6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism |
| p.118 | 18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are |
| §1 | p.65 | 6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations |
| §2 | p.65 | 6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self |
| §3 | p.66 | 6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds |
| §3 | p.66 | 6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit |
| §7 | p.68 | 6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives |
| §10 | p.69 | 6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities |
| §14 | p.71 | 6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion |
| §14 | p.71 | 6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold |
| §17 | p.72 | 6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties |
| §31 | p.79 | 6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections |
| §50 | p.89 | 6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy |
| §90 | p.110 | 6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind |
| §98 | p.113 | 6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind |
| Intro §15 | p.55 | 6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars |
| Intro §7 | p.47 | 6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects |
| §102 | p.115 | 6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature |
| §112 | p.121 | 6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move |
| §145 | p.139 | 6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects |
| §153 | p.144 | 6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings |
| 10 | p.49 | 10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas |
| 33 | p.79 | 15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience |
| Intro §11 | p.51 | 6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason |
| Intro §18 | p.58 | 6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars |
| Intro §19 | p.58 | 6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas |
| Intro §21 | p.60 | 6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible |
| Intro §22 | p.61 | 6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought |
| Intro §24 | p.62 | 6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas |
| n 49 | p.65 | 16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents |
| 1713 | Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous |
| p. | 1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects |
| p.22 | 5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended |
| p.25 | 6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's |
| p.70 | 5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations |
| p.167 | 5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things |
| I p.150 | p.150 | 3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' |
| I p.154 | p.154 | 3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities |
| I p.158 | p.158 | 3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water |
| I p.169 | p.169 | 3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities |
| I p.170 | p.170 | 3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny |
| I p.171 | p.171 | 3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object |
| I p.172 | p.172 | 3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds |
| I p.173 | p.173 | 3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses |
| I p.176 | p.176 | 3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual |
| I p.184 | p.184 | 3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind |
| I p.186 | p.186 | 3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight |
| II p.198 | p.198 | 3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness |
| II p.198 | p.198 | 3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him |
| II p.203 | p.203 | 3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? |
| II p.205 | p.205 | 3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it |
| II p.208 | p.208 | 3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? |
| II p.209 | p.209 | 3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. |
| II p.212 | p.212 | 3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it |
| II p.214 | p.214 | 3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition |
| III p.220 | p.220 | 3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind |
| III p.220 | p.220 | 3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own |
| III p.222 | p.222 | 3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent |
| III p.224 | p.224 | 3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist |
| III p.225 | p.225 | 3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter |
| III p.227 | p.227 | 3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events |
| III p.227 | p.227 | 3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law |
| III p.228 | p.228 | 3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God |
| III p.237 | p.237 | 3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves |
| III p.239 | p.239 | 3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies |
| III p.257 | p.257 | 3959 | There is no other substance in a strict sense, than spirit |
| 1734 | The Analyst |
| p.96 | 18091 | Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities |