idea number gives full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Immanuel Kant, by Text

[German, 1724 - 1804, Born and died at Königsberg, on the Baltic. Professor at the University there.]

1780 Lectures on Ethics
422:53 p.85 The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory
1781 Critique of Pure Reason
p. Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating'
p.-8 To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena
p.2 Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic
p.3 Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give anwers to speculative metaphysics
p.13 Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being'
p.13 Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate)
p.17 Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts
p.20 For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple
p.22 Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary
p.25 The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction
p.27 We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires
p.28 In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa
p.28 Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism
p.35 For Kant, essence is mental and is mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance
p.36 Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them?
p.49 If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did
p.49 Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong
p.54 Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality
p.63 Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier
p.71 Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception')
p.71 For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience
p.77 Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity
p.78 Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts
p.78 For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience
p.79 Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge
p.88 Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things
p.89 A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms…
p.89 For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation
p.96 Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law
p.104 We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12
p.107 Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic
p.109 We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature
p.115 How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form?
p.120 Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated
p.131 Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori
p.133 Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction
p.171 Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts
p.213 A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience
p.213 The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars
p.241 Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete
p.373 Understanding essentially involves singular elements
3.3 p.62 Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences
A005 p.140 A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted)
A024 p.158 Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence
A030 p.162 Objects in themselves are not known to us at all
A031 p.162 One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori
A032 p.162 That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis
A051/B075 p.193 Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind
A058 p.197 Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked
A058 p.197 We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects
A059 p.197 A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
A093 p.224 Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object?
A134/B173 p.269 Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility
A142 p.274 A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image
A177 p.296 The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity
A183 p.300 If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs
A201 p.311 The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time
A203 p.312 A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause
A205 p.313 Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change
A219/B266 p.322 Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition
A23/B58 p.175 We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation
A230 p.330 Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary?
A240/B299 p.341 Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless
A255 p.362 We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances
A263/B319 p.368 If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location
A299 p.387 Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles
A299 p.387 Reason has logical and transcendental faculties
A319 p.398 We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion
A357 p.420 We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves
A364 p.423 As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity
A383 p.433 We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism
A388 p.435 All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical
A390 p.436 Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance
A395 p.439 The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches
A398-9 p.169 For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance
A409 p.460 Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding
A42/B59 p.168 Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear
A446/B474 p.484 We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself
A450/B478 p.486 If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing
A456/B484 p.492 If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end
A468/B496 p.499 Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty
A493 p.512 There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences
A551/B579 p.542 Pure reason exists outside of time
A554/B582 p.543 In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary
A555/B583 p.544 Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed
A557/B585 p.545 Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions
A591/B619 p.563 Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori)
A596/B624 n p.566 A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible)
A597/B625 p.566 If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence
A597/B625 p.566 Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic?
A598/B626 p.566 If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction
A598/B626 p.567 Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept
A599/B627 p.567 You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist
A602/B630 p.568 The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction
A618/B646 p.576 Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter
A660/B628 p.136 Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept
A680/B708 p.610 Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects
A702/B730 p.622 Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas
A713/B741 p.380 Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object
A715/B743 p.43 We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour
A727/B755 p.637 Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries
A728/B756 p.638 No a priori concept can be defined
A732/B760 p.640 Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts
A738/B766 p.643 The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas
A757/B787 p.653 If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part
A758/B786 p.653 The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori
A762/B790 p.655 We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience
A767/B795 p.657 An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience
A784/B812 p.666 I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance
A786/B814 p.667 Reason hates to be limited in its speculations
A791/B819 p.669 If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false
A799/B827 p.674 Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative
A805/B833 p.677 Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes
A811/B839 p.680 Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide
A819/B847 p.684 We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties
A822/B850 p.686 Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both
A831/B859 p.690 In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding
B003 p.137 Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities
B003 p.137 A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience
B003-4 p.367 The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality
B004 p.137 Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition
B005 p.138 A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience
B005 p.138 Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association
B006 p.138 Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori
B009 p.140 One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further
B009 p.140 Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects
B011/A7 p.11 Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts
B014 p.144 Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience
B015 p.144 No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve
B016 p.144 With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts
B016 p.145 That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity
B017 p.145 That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic
B019 p.146 The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?
B021 p.93 You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind
B023 p.148 Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics
B045 p.161 Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject
B056 p.166 If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume to existence of two pointless non-entities
B065 p.170 That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition
B075 p.194 Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity
B084 p.197 There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic
B093 p.205 All human cognition is through concepts
B106 p.212 Four categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality
B124 p.223 Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity
B126 p.224 The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible
B128 p.226 Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception
B132 p.247 Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness
B149 p.256 A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate
B158 p.260 I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself
B163 p.263 Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances
B166 p.264 Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible
B167 p.265 Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws
B204-6 p.87 Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms
B205 p.216 If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic
B205 p.288 Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions
B205 p.288 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination
B218 p.295 Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori
B234 p.305 Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws
B265 p.321 Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found
B266 p.321 Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary
B298 p.90 Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition
B303 p.345 A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences
B314 p.364 We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions
B334 p.376 Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance
B356 p.387 Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles
B370 p.395 Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing
B373 p.397 An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens
B391 p.406 Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought
B392 p.406 Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects
B420 p.452 Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul
B422 p.453 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise)
B425 p.454 Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose
B434 p.460 Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason
B447 p.466 Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances
B452 p.469 Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions
B502 p.502 Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system
B535 p.519 The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method
Ch.5 p.65 Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity
Pref 2 B ix p.106 Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking
1781 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic
02 p.16 Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject
02 p.17 Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject
02 p.18 Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori
02 p.19 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12
02 p.20 Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality
02 p.24 Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic
07 p.36 Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure
08 p.37 Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause
08 p.37 Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object
09 p.38 I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations
09 p.38 A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses
09 p.38 A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility
10 p.38 A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves
10 p.39 All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time
10 p.39 Geometry rests on our intuition of space
10 p.39 Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts
10 p.39 Numbers are formed by addition of units in time
10 p.39 If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left
12 p.40 Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles
13 n.II p.45 I admit there are bodies outside us
13 n.II p.46 I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances
13 n.III p.50 Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience
46 p.97 The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us
1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
p.-10 Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important
p.-9 We must only value what others find acceptable
p.28 If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist
p.43 We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God
p.51 Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith
p.52 Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable
p.65 The categorical imperative smells of cruelty
p.71 Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil
p.72 Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there
p.74 Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes
p.75 Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another
p.83 The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself
p.101 For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence
p.114 Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only
p.123 Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives
p.174 We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good
p.184 If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content
p.197 Almost any precept can be consistently universalized
p.197 The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing
p.197 The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be
p.198 I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me
p.198 Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority
p.363 Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other
393.1 p.59 The only purely good thing is a good will
393.2 p.59 Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness
394.3 p.60 A good will is not good because of what it achieves
396.7 p.62 The function of reason is to produce a good will
399.13 p.65 Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed
401.15 p.66 Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings
401.16 n p.67 Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love
402.17 p.67 Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law
402.18 p.68 Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience
403.19 p.68 If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible
407.26 p.72 We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses
408.29 p.73 We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection
412.36 p.76 Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples
414.39 p.78 A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake
414.39 p.78 There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law
416.43 p.80 The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences
420.50 p.83 The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition
421.52 p.84 Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature
422.53 p.85 Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle
428.65 p.90 Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them
428.65 p.91 Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends
429.66 p.91 Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself
430.68 p.92 Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means
430.68 n p.92 The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties
432.73 p.94 Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal
435.79 p.97 Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends
437.81 p.98 The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself
437.82 p.99 The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end
446.97 p.107 Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes
448.101 p.109 We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
456.115 p.116 We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible
p.66 p.66 Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth
1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
534 p.93 Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them
1788 Critique of Practical Reason
p.30 Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness
p.240 The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value
p.240 Only human reason can confer value on our choices
Intro p.15 Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant?
Pref p.12 Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition
Pref p.13 Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism
Concl p.169 What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me
I.1.1.§3 p.23 Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher
I.1.1.§4 p.27 No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death
I.1.1.§7 p.32 A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law
I.1.1.§8 p.35 Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism
I.1.1.I p.45 A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide
I.1.II p.60 The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil
I.1.II p.61 The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles
I.1.II p.63 Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil
I.1.II p.64 Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence
I.1.II p.74 The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions
I.1.III p.75 Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will
I.1.III p.79 People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous
I.1.III p.85 Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome
I.II.II p.116 Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good
I.II.II.V p.131 We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality
I.II.II.V p.131 Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish
I.II.II.V p.132 Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason
I.II.II.V p.135 Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law
I.II.II.V p.136 Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness
I.II.II.V p.137 Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it
I.II.II.V p.138 Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means
I.II.II.V p.139 Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God)
I.II.II.VI p.145 Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you
I.II.II.VI p.145 Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics
I.II.II.VI p.145 In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left
I.II.II.VI p.146 From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones
I.II.II.VI p.146 To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds
1790 Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic
p.27 Only rational beings can experience beauty
p.160 Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are
p.423 Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good
1790 Critique of Judgement II: Teleological
p.244 What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation
C3 442 p.242 Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose
C3 443 p.243 Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose
1795 Wiener Logik
p.455 p.11 A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition
p.843 p.12 If we knew what we know, we would be astonished