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### Ideas of Willard Quine, by Text

#### [American, 1908 - 2000, Born in Ohio. Studied with Carnap in Vienna. Professor at Harvard University. Taught Davidson and Lewis.]

 1935 Truth by Convention
 p.7 20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Rey]
 p.102 p.102 8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false
 p.104 p.104 8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions
 p.106 p.106 9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role?
 p.327 p.121 10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Musgrave]
 p.79 p.79 8993 If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic
 p.87 p.87 8994 If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry
 p.89 p.89 8995 Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute
 p.95 p.95 8996 If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money...
 p.99 p.99 8997 There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry
 1937 New Foundations for Mathematical Logic
 p.230 9879 NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Dummett]
 1940 Mathematical Logic (revised)
 p.161 19321 We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Kirkham]
 1.6 p.36 12221 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate'
 1941 Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic
 p.16 13639 Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Shapiro]
 p.133 21557 Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Lackey]
 1946 Lecture on Nominalism
 §3 p.8 21696 Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes)
 §4 p.9 21697 The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand
 §8 p.14 21698 All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic
 1948 On What There Is
 p.1 1619 There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett]
 p.11 19277 Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Hale]
 p.17 4064 The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Crane]
 p.27 8455 Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Orenstein]
 p.29 8456 Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Orenstein]
 p.47 8459 Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Orenstein]
 p.83 16261 If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin]
 p.114 19159 Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Davidson]
 p.141 10241 For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Shapiro]
 p.161 12210 Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K]
 p.503 4443 Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Armstrong]
 §1 p.196 8856 Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Yablo]
 Ch.6 p.177 7698 If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette]
 p.10 p.10 15402 There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
 p.11 p.11 1609 I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have'
 p.11 p.11 1617 The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy
 p.12 p.12 1611 Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those
 p.13 p.13 1610 To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun
 p.14 p.14 1614 Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made
 p.14 p.14 1615 Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients
 p.14 p.14 1613 Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities
 p.14 p.14 1612 Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism
 p.15 p.15 1616 Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning
 p.15 p.15 1618 We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts
 p.16 p.16 8496 What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
 p.16 p.16 8497 An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences
 p.17 p.17 8498 Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
 p.18 p.173 18209 We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
 p.4 p.4 12443 Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?
 1950 Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis
 1 p.65 11092 A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process
 1 p.68 17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
 2 p.69 11094 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop
 2 p.69 11093 We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape
 2 p.71 11096 Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree
 2 p.71 11095 We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse
 3 p.72 11097 Red is the largest red thing in the universe
 4 p.75 11099 Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object
 4 p.76 11101 General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do
 5 p.78 11103 We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it
 5 p.78 11102 Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms
 5 p.79 11104 Concepts are language
 1951 On Carnap's Views on Ontology
 p.122 22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Boulter]
 p.205 p.205 19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers
 p.205 p.205 19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything
 p.211 p.211 19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses
 1952 On Mental Entities
 p.225 p.225 21686 Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables
 p.225 p.225 21685 Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science
 1953 Three Grades of Modal Involvement
 p.105 12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Fine,K]
 p.158 p.158 10921 Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences
 p.174 p.174 10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into
 p.176 p.176 10923 Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties
 p.176 p.176 10924 Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves
 1953 Mr Strawson on Logical Theory
 p.187 13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Sider]
 1953 Reference and Modality
 p.3 9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Fine,K]
 p.4 9203 We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Fine,K]
 §1 p.140 10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential
 §2 p.148 10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense
 §2 p.148 14645 To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to
 §3 p.151 10927 Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified
 §3 p.152 10928 Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely
 §3 p.155 10930 Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence
 §4 p.158 10931 We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally
 1953 Two Dogmas of Empiricism
 p.1 9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Boghossian]
 p.6 9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K]
 p.20 9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian]
 p.30 14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Thomasson]
 p.80 12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Kitcher]
 p.117 7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Miller,A]
 p.123 19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Yablo]
 p.141 19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo]
 p.147 12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [McFetridge]
 p.150 7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A]
 p.158 8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson]
 p.166 9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Horwich]
 p.166 9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich]
 p.168 9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich]
 p.214 17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Jenkins]
 p.214 17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins]
 p.407 15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Shoemaker]
 §1 p.22 10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning
 §1 p.22 9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy
 p.20 p.20 1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts
 p.22 p.22 1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important
 p.24 p.24 1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
 p.26 p.26 1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it
 p.32 p.32 1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
 p.41 p.41 1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body
 p.42 p.42 1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component
 p.43 p.43 1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system
 p.44 p.44 1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
 p.45 p.45 1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple
 1954 Carnap and Logical Truth
 p.227 13829 If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking]
 p.233 13010 In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian]
 I p.107 9001 Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?'
 II p.110 9002 Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables
 II p.111 9004 If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic
 II p.111 9003 Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling
 p.103 p.9 13681 Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Sider]
 VI p.122 9005 Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge
 x p.132 9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
 1954 The Scope and Language of Science
 §6 p.242 8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes
 §VI p.243 8462 A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental
 §VI p.244 8463 Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory
 1955 Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes
 §II p.188 9471 Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised
 1960 On Simple Theories of a Complex World
 p.255 p.255 21687 It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience
 p.258 p.258 21688 There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories
 1960 Speaking of Objects
 p.95 5747 "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Melia]
 §5 p.21 13387 Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects
 IV p.19 7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
 p.52 p.157 8277 I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe]
 pt.I,p.1 p.1 1630 We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract)
 pt.III,p.11 p.11 1631 You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs
 pt.V,p.25 p.25 1632 Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages
 1960 Word and Object
 p.7 3131 Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Rey]
 p.20 4630 Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Baggini /Fosl]
 p.239 3988 Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett]
 p.465 6891 Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Mautner]
 §01 p.4 6310 Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available
 §07 p.27 6311 The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge
 §09 p.38 6312 We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai'
 §12 p.51 6313 Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive
 §13 p.58 6314 Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them
 §15 p.69 6315 We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs
 §15 p.72 6317 Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation
 §19 p.90 12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether
 §33 p.161 16462 The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation
 §36 p.171 8464 Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected
 §41 p.199 8482 Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist?
 §41.5 p.86 12136 Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody]
 §43 p.100 8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Devitt]
 §46 p.86 15490 Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Martin,CB]
 §46 p.221 15722 Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known
 §46 p.222 15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context
 §46 p.222 15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures
 §46 p.222 15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is
 §46 p.225 15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal'
 §46 p.225 15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science
 §46 p.226 15725 Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false.
 §47 p.230 17594 We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy'
 §48 p.238 7924 The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science
 §54 p.262 17905 Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity
 §55 p.269 9556 Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects
 1961 The Ways of Paradox
 p.02 p.2 21689 A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself?
 p.03 p.3 21690 Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on
 p.05 p.5 21691 Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions
 p.07 p.7 21692 If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox
 p.11 p.11 21693 Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set
 p.13 p.13 21694 Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical
 p.16 p.16 21695 The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one
 1961 works
 p.1 8450 Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Orenstein]
 p.3 3751 Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Jacquette]
 p.5 3302 Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Benardete,JA]
 p.5 16021 Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Noonan]
 p.17 10311 No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Hale]
 p.27 8453 If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers
 p.29 10211 Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Shapiro]
 p.36 10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Shapiro]
 p.57 8466 For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Orenstein]
 p.57 8467 Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Orenstein]
 p.64 3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Benardete,JA]
 p.66 4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [O'Grady]
 p.68 4713 For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [O'Grady]
 p.68 6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [McGinn]
 p.87 3325 For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Benardete,JA]
 p.125 8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Orenstein]
 p.129 3336 Two things can never entail three things [Benardete,JA]
 p.165 8534 Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Armstrong]
 p.166 10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Marcus (Barcan)]
 p.181 3868 To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Newton-Smith]
 p.222 2796 For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Dancy,J]
 p.272 7330 The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Miller,A]
 p.277 15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan]
 p.277 15782 Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Lycan]
 p.348 13736 Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J]
 p.360 17862 Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Almog]
 p.414 10667 A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Hossack]
 p.478 10538 Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Dummett]
 Ch.6 n15 p.255 7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Macdonald,C]
 1962 Letters
 1962.06.01 p. 21338 I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage
 1962 Reply to Professor Marcus
 p.183 p.183 10801 Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions
 1963 Necessary Truth
 p.76 p.76 4577 There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity
 1963 Set Theory and its Logic
 p.249-58 p.92 21717 Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Linsky,B]
 1965 Propositional Objects
 p.139 p.139 18967 A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence
 p.140 p.140 18968 The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition?
 p.144 p.144 18969 How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs?
 p.149 p.149 18970 The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position
 1966 Existence and Quantification
 p.63 5745 Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia]
 p.167 14490 You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson]
 p.197 8789 Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
 p.216 4216 Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Lowe]
 p.100 p.100 16966 Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that
 p.106 p.106 18966 Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified
 p.92 p.92 16961 In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables
 p.94 p.94 16963 Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants
 p.95 p.95 16964 Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true
 p.97 p.97 16965 All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express
 1966 Russell's Ontological Development
 p.75 p.75 21699 Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects
 p.75 p.75 21700 Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible
 p.76 p.76 21701 Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it
 1967 Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types
 p.152 p.12 18170 The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed
 1968 Epistemology Naturalized
 p.3 7627 You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund]
 p.193 8871 We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Davidson]
 p.305 8826 If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim]
 p.306 8827 Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim]
 p.69-70 p.69 1635 Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper
 p.75 p.75 8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence
 p.83 p.83 8899 Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence
 p.86 p.86 8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity
 1968 Ontological Relativity
 p.68 8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Orenstein]
 p.35 p.35 18963 Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms
 p.53 p.53 1633 Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions
 p.54 p.54 18964 Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual
 p.55 p.55 18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology
 p.64 p.83 21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology
 p.67 p.67 1634 Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory
 1969 Natural Kinds
 p.381 7375 Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Dennett]
 p.115-6 p.115 16932 Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer
 p.116 p.116 16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
 p.116 p.116 16934 General terms depend on similarities among things
 p.118 p.118 16935 If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another
 p.119 p.119 16936 Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red'
 p.120 p.120 16937 You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle
 p.122 p.122 16938 To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour?
 p.123 p.123 8486 Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped
 p.124 p.124 16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation
 p.125 p.125 16941 Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause
 p.125 p.125 16940 Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations
 p.126 p.126 16943 Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point
 p.126 p.126 16942 It is hard to see how regularities could be explained
 p.129 p.129 16944 Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method
 p.130 p.130 16945 We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve
 p.131 p.131 16946 Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms
 p.134 p.134 16947 Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine
 p.135 p.135 16948 Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity'
 p.137 p.137 16949 Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations
 1970 Philosophy of Logic
 p.130 10014 Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Hodes]
 Ch.1 p.3 9007 It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition
 Ch.1 p.4 9008 There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences
 Ch.1 p.8 9009 Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth
 Ch.1 p.10 9010 We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence
 Ch.1 p.11 9012 Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences
 Ch.1 p.11 9011 Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence
 Ch.2 p.24 9013 We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)'
 Ch.2 p.24 9014 Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q)
 Ch.2 p.25 9016 Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication
 Ch.2 p.25 9015 Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification
 Ch.2 p.27 9017 Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication
 Ch.2 p.31 9019 Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times
 Ch.2 p.36 9018 A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time
 Ch.3 p.36 9020 My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification
 Ch.3 p.40 9021 A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true
 Ch.5 p.62 10012 Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity
 Ch.5 p.66 10828 Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities
 Ch.5 p.66 10705 Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity
 Ch.6 p.81 9023 If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject
 Ch.6 p.83 9024 Excluded middle has three different definitions
 Ch.6 p.92 9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named
 Ch.6 p.93 9026 Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects
 Ch.7 p.95 9028 Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages
 Ch.7 p.95 9027 A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true
 1972 Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory
 p.281 15788 Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Lycan]
 1972 Vagaries of Definition
 p.51 p.51 8202 Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words
 p.51 p.51 8201 The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction
 p.53 p.53 8203 All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets
 1974 On Multiplying Entities
 p.260 p.260 8205 Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time
 p.262 p.262 8207 The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases
 p.262 p.262 8206 Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia
 p.263 p.263 8208 In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise
 1975 Five Milestones of Empiricism
 p.67 p.67 19046 Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism
 p.68 p.68 19047 Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful
 p.69 p.69 19048 Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences
 p.70 p.70 19049 In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning
 p.71 p.71 19050 Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences
 1975 On the Individuation of Attributes
 p.100 p.100 18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
 p.101 p.101 18440 Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive
 p.102 p.102 18441 No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation)
 p.106 p.106 18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it
 1975 Reply to Hellman
 p.206 p.17 9379 A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it
 1977 Intensions Revisited
 p.118 p.118 13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism
 p.118 p.118 13588 A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits
 p.121 p.121 8483 Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry
 p.121 p.121 13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates
 p.121 p.121 13591 Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn
 p.123 p.123 13592 Beliefs can be ascribed to machines
 1978 on Goodman's 'Ways of Worldmaking'
 p.98 p.98 18438 Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states
 1978 On the Nature of Moral Values
 p.57 p.57 21748 More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method
 p.58 p.58 21749 Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices
 p.63 p.63 21750 Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation
 p.65 p.65 21751 Love seems to diminish with distance to oneself
 1979 Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?
 p.192 p.192 9763 For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary
 p.193 p.193 9764 Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy
 1981 On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma
 p.42 p.42 19045 Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability
 1981 What Price Bivalence?
 p.32 p.32 19042 Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined
 p.36 p.36 19043 Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object
 1984 Review of Parsons (1983)
 p.788 p.105 18198 Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted
 1985 Events and Reification
 p.7 10370 Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Schaffer,J]
 1990 The Roots of Reference
 p.11 p.13 14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term
 1992 Structure and Nature
 p.6 p.142 10242 I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately
 p.9 p.142 10243 My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc.
 1995 From Stimulus to Science
 p.23 p.32 6564 To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not'