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Ideas of Gilbert Ryle, by Text

[British, 1900 - 1976, Born in Brighton. Professor at the University of Oxford. Taught A.J.Ayer and Daniel Dennett.]

1930 Are there propositions?
'Conclusions' p.39 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way
I p.16 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous
I p.16 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind
IV p.21 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic
IV p.22 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion
IV p.22 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment?
IV p.22 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding....
'Objections' p.25 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two
'Objections' p.25 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones
'Objections' p.27 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all.
'Objections' p.27 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show
'Objections' p.28 Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations
'Substitute' p.33 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French
'Substitute' p.35 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated
1938 Categories
p.189 p.8 We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories
1949 The Concept of Mind
p.14 How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour?
p.14 Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs
p.176 You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real
Intro p.8 p.10 Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories
Ch.6 p.159 We cannot introspect states of anger or panic
Ch.6 p.185 Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you
I (2) p.17 Dualism is a category mistake
I (3) p.23 Can one movement have a mental and physical cause?
II (7) p.43 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition
V (1) p.113 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency
VI (7) p.188 I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think
1950 works
p.183 The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions