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Ideas of Alfred Tarski, by Text
[Polish, 1902  1983, Taught in Warsaw 19251939, then University of California at Berkeley from 1942 to 1968.]
1933

The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages


p.1

15322

Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Horsten]


p.4

16295

Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Halbach]


p.5

16296

Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Halbach]


p.9

15410

Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess]


p.15

16302

Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Halbach]


p.15

15339

Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Horsten]


p.15

19134

Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson]


p.17

16303

Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Halbach]


p.17

19135

Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson]


p.18

15342

Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Horsten]


p.19

16304

Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove noncontradiction [Halbach]


p.22

10969

Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Read]


p.23

16306

Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Halbach]


p.27

19138

Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson]


p.31

17746

Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Walicki]


p.32

4699

Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [O'Grady]


p.37

18756

Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [McGee]


p.38

8940

Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Fisher]


p.42

18759

Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [McGee]


p.60

10904

Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]


p.62

20407

Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Schellekens]


p.72

18811

Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Rumfitt]


p.74

15365

We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Horsten]


p.111

2571

Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Haack]


p.123

10154

Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman]


p.141

19313

Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Kirkham]


p.142

19314

For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physicalpluslogic [Kirkham]


p.146

16323

The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Halbach]


p.152

19316

Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Kirkham]


p.160

19175

Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Davidson]


p.172

19324

Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham]


p.377

10821

Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Field,H]


p.381

10822

A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H]


p.417

10672

Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Hossack]

§1

p.165

19069

'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless

p.194

p.382

10823

A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function

1936

The Establishment of Scientific Semantics

p.401

p.401

13335

Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth

p.402

p.402

13336

A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent  but we can use a second language

p.402

p.402

13337

A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules

p.404

p.404

13338

'"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth

p.405

p.405

13339

A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned

p.406

p.406

13340

Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it

p.407

p.407

13341

Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics

1936

The Concept of Logical Consequence


p.73

18812

Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Rumfitt]

p.417

p.417

13344

X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X

p.417

p.417

13343

A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions

p.418

p.418

13345

Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them


p.6

10694

Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Beall/Restall]


p.9

10479

Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Hodges,W]


p.31

19141

Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Davidson]


p.103

10048

There is no clear boundary between the logical and the nonlogical


p.112

10153

In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical


p.230

10157

Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without settheory [Feferman/Feferman]

1944

The Semantic Conception of Truth

01

p.13

19178

Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one

01

p.13

19177

A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct

01

p.14

19179

For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language

02

p.14

19180

It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified

04

p.15

19181

In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white

04

p.16

19182

Use 'true' so that all Tsentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate'

04

p.16

19183

Each interpreted Tsentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction

04

p.387

10824

If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witchvictim pairs [Field,H]

05

p.17

19185

Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems

05

p.17

19184

The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects)

06

p.19

19186

A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language

07

p.20

19187

The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously

0809

p.20

19188

We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a metalanguage is needed

09

p.22

19189

The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics

10

p.24

19190

We need an undefined term 'true' in the metalanguage, specified by axioms

11

p.25

19191

Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects

12

p.26

19192

The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws)

14

p.27

19193

Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless

14

p.28

19194

We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms

15

p.29

19196

Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth

15

p.29

19195

Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions

16

p.31

19197

Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims

18

p.33

19198

We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true

19

p.35

19199

Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects


p.52

10152

Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying


p.52

10151

I am a deeply convinced nominalist
