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Ideas of John Perry, by Text

[American, fl. 1975, Professor at Standford University.]

1970 The Same F
I p.91 Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F
n12 p.99 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
1979 The Problem of the Essential Indexical
p.28 Tense is essential for thought and action
p.29 Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context
'Intro' p.167 If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour
'Intro' p.167 Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations
'Obvious' p.181 Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction
'Prob' p.172 Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition
2001 Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness
1.2 p.6 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
1.2 p.6 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
2.4 p.38 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur
3.1 p.48 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
3.2 p.51 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
3.2 p.54 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought
4.2 p.78 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
4.3 p.88 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
8.1 p.170 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension
8.1 p.170 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
8.1 p.170 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
8.1 p.170 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth
8.1 p.171 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
8.1 p.175 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world
2001 Reference and Reflexivity
p.249 Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves