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Ideas of Gareth Evans, by Text

[British, 1946 - 1980, Wilde Reader at Oxford University. Died of cancer.]

1973 The Causal Theory of Names
žI p.1 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
žI p.3 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
žI p.5 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs
žI p.11 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
žI p.13 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
žII p.14 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
žII p.17 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
žII p.18 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
žII p.21 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
1978 Molyneux's Question
p.397 p.397 The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally
1978 Can there be Vague Objects?
p.11 Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague
p.107 If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity
p.176 Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
p.319 Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right
p.319 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
4.7 p.118 There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b
1979 Reference and Contingency
p.3 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
p.16 Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty
1980 The Varieties of Reference
p.88 Experiences have no conceptual content
4.3 p.1 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
7.5 p.229 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
p.104 p.65 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything