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Ideas of Ernest Sosa, by Text

[American, b.1940, Professor at Brown University, Long Island. Visiting Professor at Rutgers University.]

1980 The Raft and the Pyramid
10 p.146 Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification
11 p.148 If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations
3 p.136 There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them
4 p.136 Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error
6 p.141 A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not
9 p.145 The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent
1980 Varieties of Causation
1 p.234 What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence?
2 p.237 Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts
5 p.240 Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall?
p.242 p.242 The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator
2003 Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues
6.1 p.99 Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face
6.4 p.111 We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit
6.6 p.115 It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching
6.6 p.116 Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge
6.7 p.117 In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism
6.7 p.117 Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support
7.2 p.124 Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts
7.3 p.128 Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience?
7.3 p.128 The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven
7.5 p.134 Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred