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Ideas of Paul Horwich, by Text
[British, b.1947, At University College, London, and New York University.]
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p.208
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p.208
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8432
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Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around
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p208
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p.208
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8431
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Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
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Ch.1
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p.1
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6332
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The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily
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Ch.2.11
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p.46
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6336
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No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
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Ch.2.17
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p.57
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6337
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The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
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Ch.2.8
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p.36
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6334
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The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
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Ch.2.9
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p.39
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6335
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The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p
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Ch.5.22 n1
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p.69
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6338
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We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning
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Ch.6.30
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p.88
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6339
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Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments
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Ch.6.31
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p.91
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6340
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There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture
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Ch.6.32
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p.93
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6341
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Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage
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Ch.7.35
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p.104
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6342
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Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction
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Concl
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p.118
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6344
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Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
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p.41
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p.41
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2798
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Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
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p.42
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p.42
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2799
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Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
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2000
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Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority
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§11
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p.168
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9339
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A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds
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§12
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p.169
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9341
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Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable
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§12
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p.169
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9342
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Understanding needs a priori commitment
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§2
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p.151
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9331
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How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
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§8
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p.162
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9332
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Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around
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§8
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p.162
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9333
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A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
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§9
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p.163
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9334
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If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle
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