| 1987 | Lewis's Programme |
| p.208 | p.208 | 8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around |
| p208 | p.208 | 8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis |
| 1990 | Truth (2nd edn) |
| Ch.1 | p.1 | 6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily |
| Ch.2.11 | p.46 | 6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth |
| Ch.2.17 | p.57 | 6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory |
| Ch.2.7 | p.34 | 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic |
| Ch.2.8 | p.36 | 6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? |
| Ch.2.9 | p.39 | 6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p |
| Ch.5.22 n1 | p.69 | 6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning |
| Ch.6.30 | p.88 | 6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments |
| Ch.6.31 | p.91 | 6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture |
| Ch.6.32 | p.93 | 6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage |
| Ch.7.35 | p.104 | 6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction |
| Concl | p.118 | 6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them |
| 1992 | Bayesianism |
| p.41 | p.41 | 2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) |
| p.42 | p.42 | 2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence |
| 2000 | Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority |
| §11 | p.168 | 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds |
| §12 | p.169 | 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable |
| §12 | p.169 | 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment |
| §2 | p.151 | 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? |
| §8 | p.162 | 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge |
| §8 | p.162 | 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around |
| §9 | p.163 | 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle |