1977 | Logicism Revisited |
§3 | p.105 | 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' |
§3 | p.106 | 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains |
§4 | p.113 | 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers |
§4 n | p.112 | 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity |
§5 | p.119 | 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics |
§5 | p.119 | 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics |
§5 | p.120 | 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism |
§5 | p.124 | 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic |