idea number gives full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Graeme Forbes, by Text

[American, fl. 1995, Professor at Tulane University.]

1985 The Metaphysics of Modality
p.25 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties
127-8 p.31 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic
3.1 p.49 De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities
3.5 p.66 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity
4.1 p.72 The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)'
4.1 p.74 Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems
4.2 p.77 Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own
4.2 p.78 Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them
4.2 p.79 The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects
4.4 p.82 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules?
5.1 p.97 Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts
5.1 p.97 Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist
5.1 p.97 Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things
5.1 p.99 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have
5.1 p.99 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational
5.1 p.100 The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences
5.5 p.130 In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity
6.5 p.148 An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin
6.6 p.148 Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness
7.2 p.168 Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact
7.3 p.169 Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages
7.4 p.179 If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock.
7.6 p.186 Artefacts have fuzzy essences
9.1 p.217 There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory
9.4 p.232 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is
9.4 p.235 We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual
1986 In Defense of Absolute Essentialism
1 p.3 A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property
2 p.4 Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature
2 p.4 Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities
2 p.4 A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects
2 p.4 A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist
3 p.10 One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made
3 p.11 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing