| 1985 | The Metaphysics of Modality |
| p.25 | 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties |
| 127-8 | p.31 | 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic |
| 3.1 | p.49 | 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities |
| 3.5 | p.66 | 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity |
| 4.1 | p.72 | 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' |
| 4.1 | p.74 | 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems |
| 4.2 | p.77 | 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own |
| 4.2 | p.78 | 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them |
| 4.2 | p.79 | 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects |
| 4.4 | p.82 | 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? |
| 5.1 | p.97 | 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts |
| 5.1 | p.97 | 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist |
| 5.1 | p.97 | 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things |
| 5.1 | p.99 | 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have |
| 5.1 | p.99 | 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational |
| 5.1 | p.100 | 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences |
| 5.5 | p.130 | 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity |
| 6.5 | p.148 | 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin |
| 6.6 | p.148 | 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness |
| 7.2 | p.168 | 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact |
| 7.3 | p.169 | 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages |
| 7.4 | p.179 | 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. |
| 7.6 | p.186 | 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences |
| 9.1 | p.217 | 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory |
| 9.4 | p.232 | 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is |
| 9.4 | p.235 | 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual |
| 1986 | In Defense of Absolute Essentialism |
| 1 | p.3 | 13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property |
| 2 | p.4 | 13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities |
| 2 | p.4 | 13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist |
| 2 | p.4 | 13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature |
| 2 | p.4 | 13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects |
| 3 | p.10 | 13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made |
| 3 | p.11 | 13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing |