2001 | Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' |
§1 | p.1 | 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers |
§2 n5 | p.4 | 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized |
3.1 | p.8 | 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to |
3.2 | p.12 | 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions |
3.2 | p.17 | 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities |
3.2 | p.18 | 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological |
3.2 n26 | p.15 | 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity |
3.2 n26 | p.15 | 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts |
2007 | Logicism in the 21st Century |
1 | p.167 | 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines |
1 | p.169 | 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic |
1 n2 | p.167 | 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach |
3 | p.179 | 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' |
8 | p.196 | 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology |
8 | p.197 | 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic |
2009 | The Metaontology of Abstraction |
§3 | p.182 | 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure |
§4 | p.184 | 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? |
§4 n19 | p.186 | 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment |
§5 | p.187 | 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence |
§5 | p.188 | 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions |
§8 | p.195 | 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp |
§9 | p.197 | 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses |
§9 | p.198 | 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology |
§9 | p.207 | 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true |
§9 | p.208 | 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense |