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Ideas of George Molnar, by Text

[Australian, 1934 - 1999, Born in Hungary. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney.]

1998 Powers
1.1 p.21 Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means
1.2 p.24 For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts
1.2 p.25 Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding
1.4.1 p.30 If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties
1.4.2 p.31 'Being physical' is a second-order property
1.4.3 p.36 Structural properties are derivate properties
1.4.4 p.37 The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it
1.4.4 p.38 A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity
1.4.4 p.38 Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection
1.4.5 p.41 The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round
1.4.5 p.42 Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic
1.4.6 p.43 Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism
10.2 p.158 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers
10.3 p.163 It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world
11.3 p.184 Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true
12.1 p.187 Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization
12.1 p.187 Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa
12.2.2 p.210 Nominalists only accept first-order logic
12.2.2 p.211 What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible?
158-62 p.187 Location in space and time are non-power properties
2 Intr p.47 The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations
2.1 p.51 The essence of a muon doesn't entail its other essential properties
2.2 p.53 Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small
2.4 p.57 Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity
3.1 p.60 A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation
3.2 p.61 The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality
3.4 p.63 Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness
3.5.3 p.71 The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness
4.2.3 p.93 We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa
4.3.1 p.97 If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers
5 p.101 Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world
6.1 p.104 Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles
6.3 p.109 Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects
7.2.3 p.123 Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid
8.4.3 p.135 The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers
8.5.2 p.140 Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative
8.5.3 p.141 We should analyse causation in terms of powers
9.1.2 p.147 There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts