| 1996 | Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind |
| p.42 | 9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? |
| IV | p.45 | 9979 | Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic |
| IV | p.45 | 9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said |
| IX | p.55 | 9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' |
| n 14 | p.62 | 9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' |
| V | p.46 | 9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals |
| V | p.47 | 9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete |
| V | p.47 | 9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs |
| VI | p.49 | 9983 | Cantor took the ordinal numbers to be primary |
| VII | p.51 | 9984 | We can have a series with identical members |
| VIII | p.53 | 9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements |
| 2005 | Intro to 'Provenance of Pure Reason' |
| p.4 | p.222 | 13416 | Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa |