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Ideas of John Bacon, by Text

[Australian, fl. 1997, At the University of Sydney.]

2008 Tropes
Intro p.1 A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality)
     Full Idea: A trope is an instance or bit (not an exemplification) of a property or a relation. Bill Clinton's eloquence is not his participating in the universal eloquence, or the peculiar quality of his eloquence, but his bit, and his alone, of eloquence.
     From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: If we have identified something as a 'bit' of something, we can ask whether that bit is atomic, or divisible into something else, and we can ask what are the qualities and properties and powers of this bit, we seems to defeat the object.
2 p.3 Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category
     Full Idea: A major attraction of tropism has been its promise of parsimony; some adherents (such as Campbell) go so far as to proclaim a one-category ontology.
     From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to go against the folk idiom which suggests that it is things which have properties, rather than properties ruling to roost. Maybe if one identified tropes with processes, the theory could be brought more into line with modern physics?
3 p.4 Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes
     Full Idea: Meinongian tropism has the advantage that possible worlds might be thought of as sets of 'qualitons' and 'relatons' (quality and relational tropes).
     From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], 3)
     A reaction: You are still left with 'possible' to explain, and I'm not sure that anything is explain here. If the actual world is sets of tropes, then possible worlds would also have to be, I suppose.
4 p.4 Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes
     Full Idea: 'Qualitons' or 'relatons' (quality and relation tropes) are held to belong to the same individual if they are all 'compresent' with one another.
     From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], 4)
     A reaction: There is a perennial problem with bundles - how to distinguish accidental compresence (like people in a lift) from united compresence (like people who make a family).