| 1990 | Explaining Explanation |
| Ch 1 | p.7 | 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation |
| Ch 1 | p.9 | 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? |
| Ch 4 | p.124 | 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically |
| Ch 5 | p.175 | 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation |
| Ch 5 | p.180 | 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately |
| Ch 6 | p.197 | 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments |
| Ch 7 | p.210 | 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure |
| Ch 7 | p.231 | 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal |