| 1993 | The Disorder of Things |
| Intro | p.3 | 17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism |
| Intro | p.5 | 17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification |
| 1 | p.18 | 17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory |
| 1 | p.26 | 17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience |
| 1 | p.27 | 17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals |
| 1 | p.30 | 17380 | Wales may count as fish |
| 1 | p.32 | 17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage |
| 1 | p.34 | 17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions |
| 2 | p.37 | 17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology |
| 2 | p.39 | 17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons |
| 2 | p.40 | 17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract |
| 2 | p.42 | 17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species |
| 2 | p.43 | 17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy |
| 2 | p.53 | 17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds |
| 2 | p.55 | 17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one |
| 3 | p.67 | 17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory |
| Ch 1 | p.18 | 17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object |