| 1989 | Metaphysics: the logical approach |
| After | p.202 | 3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism |
| Full Idea: In contemporary metaphysics the major areas of discussion are Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], After) |
| Ch. 2 | p.15 | 3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? |
| Full Idea: Why suppose these particles packed together constitute a macro-entity (namely, Mt Everest), whereas those, of equal number, scattered around, fail to add up to anything beyond themselves? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 2) |
| Ch. 4 | p.20 | 3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction |
| Full Idea: One proves non-existence (e.g. of round squares) by using logic to derive a contradiction from the concept; it is precisely here, in such proofs, that we find the clearest example of a priori knowledge. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |
| Ch. 4 | p.21 | 3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' |
| Full Idea: In the ontological argument a deep enough understanding of the very concept of God allows one to derive by logic a contradiction from the statement 'There is no God'. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |
| Ch. 6 | p.34 | 3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? |
| Full Idea: If a soldier need not cease to exist merely because he ceases to be a soldier, there is room to doubt that the wind ceases to exist when it ceases to be a wind. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
| Ch. 6 | p.36 | 3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist |
| Full Idea: Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) | |||
| A reaction: What happens when you try to derive metaphysics from logic. We must make the binary choice of quantifying or not over each thing. Why must Tom's fast walk be sliced up, or forced into precise sub-categories? Events overlap, and lack clear boundries. |
| Ch. 6 | p.36 | 12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns |
| Full Idea: With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) | |||
| A reaction: The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there. |
| Ch. 7 | p.44 | 3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) |
| Full Idea: At least since Russell, one has routinely distinguished between the 'is' of predication ('Socrates is wise', Fx), the 'is' of identity ('Morning Star is Evening Star', =), and the 'is' of existence ('the cat is under the bed', Ex). | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 7) | |||
| A reaction: This seems horribly nitpicking to many people, but I love it - because it is just true, and it is a truth right at the basis of the confusions in our talk. Analytic philosophy forever! [P.S. 'Tiddles is a cat' - the 'is' membership] |
| Ch. 8 | p.50 | 3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? |
| Full Idea: With the thesis that to be as such is to be relative, the absolutist may be found to concur, but the issue turns on what it might be that a thing is supposed to be relative to. Why not itself? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 8) |
| Ch.11 | p.70 | 3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent |
| Full Idea: 'Existence' can't be glossed as self-identical (critics say) because Pegasus, even while being self-identical, fails to exist. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.11) |
| Ch.13 | p.89 | 3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics |
| Full Idea: Set theory offers the promise of a complete mathematization of the 'is' of predication. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
| Ch.13 | p.90 | 3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it |
| Full Idea: Set inclusion is sharply distinguished from set membership (as the set of Greeks is found to be included in, but not a member of, the set of men). | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
| Ch.13 | p.94 | 3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? |
| Full Idea: As our bible, the Book of Science is presumed to contain only true sentences, but it is less clear how they are to be construed, which literally and which non-literally. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
| Ch.14 | p.99 | 3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations |
| Full Idea: The Negative numbers are postulated (magic word) to solve x=5-8, Rationals postulated to solve 2x=3, Irrationals for x-squared=2, and Imaginaries for x-squared=-1. (…and Zero for x=5-5) …and x/0 remains eternally open. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.14) |
| Ch.15 | p.109 | 3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic |
| Full Idea: The Greeks saw the independent science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.15) |
| Ch.16 | p.119 | 3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions |
| Full Idea: Rationalists have been happier with an ontology of points, and empiricists with an ontology of regions. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.16) |
| Ch.17 | p.124 | 3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms |
| Full Idea: Zermelo proposed seven axioms for set theory, with Fraenkel adding others, to produce the standard Z-F Intuition. | |||
| From: report of José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| Ch.17 | p.130 | 3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) |
| Full Idea: One approaches the natural numbers in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory). | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) |
| Ch.18 | p.131 | 3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' |
| Full Idea: Logical positivism has been concisely summarised as 'there is no synthetic a priori'. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.18 | p.135 | 3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic |
| Full Idea: No one thinks that the proposition that something exists that transcends all possible experience harbours a logical inconsistency. Its denial cannot therefore be an analytic proposition, so it must be synthetic, though only knowable on a priori grounds. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.18 | p.136 | 3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge |
| Full Idea: Appeals to intuition - no matter how informal - can hardly fail to smack of the synthetic a priori. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.18 | p.139 | 3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects |
| Full Idea: Assume that we know to be true propositions of the form 'There are exactly x prime numbers between y and z', and synthetic a priori truths about Platonic objects are delivered to us on a silver platter. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.20 | p.146 | 3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? |
| Full Idea: Is being a horse an essential property of a horse? Can we so much as conceive the abstract possibility of a horse's ceasing to be a horse even while continuing to exist? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.20) |
| Ch.21 | p.156 | 3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water |
| Full Idea: One can step into the same river twice, but one must not expect to step into the same water. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.21) |
| Ch.22 | p.172 | 3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results |
| Full Idea: Analytical philosophy excels in the piecemeal analysis of causation, perception, knowledge and so on, but there is a striking poverty of any synoptic vision of these independent studies. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
| Ch.22 | p.174 | 3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? |
| Full Idea: How can you learn of the existence of transcendent Platonic objects if there is no causal interaction with them? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |