| 1989 | Metaphysics: the logical approach |
| After | p.202 | 3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism |
| Full Idea: In contemporary metaphysics the major areas of discussion are Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], After) |
| Ch. 2 | p.15 | 3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? |
| Full Idea: Why suppose these particles packed together constitute a macro-entity (namely, Mt Everest), whereas those, of equal number, scattered around, fail to add up to anything beyond themselves? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 2) |
| Ch. 4 | p.20 | 3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction |
| Full Idea: One proves non-existence (e.g. of round squares) by using logic to derive a contradiction from the concept; it is precisely here, in such proofs, that we find the clearest example of a priori knowledge. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |
| Ch. 4 | p.21 | 3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' |
| Full Idea: In the ontological argument a deep enough understanding of the very concept of God allows one to derive by logic a contradiction from the statement 'There is no God'. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |
| Ch. 6 | p.34 | 3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? |
| Full Idea: If a soldier need not cease to exist merely because he ceases to be a soldier, there is room to doubt that the wind ceases to exist when it ceases to be a wind. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
| Ch. 6 | p.36 | 3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist |
| Full Idea: Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
| Ch. 6 | p.36 | 12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns |
| Full Idea: With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) | |||
| A reaction: The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there. |
| Ch. 7 | p.44 | 3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) |
| Full Idea: At least since Russell, one has routinely distinguished between the 'is' of predication ('Socrates is wise', Fx), the 'is' of identity ('Morning Star is Evening Star', =), and the 'is' of existence ('the cat is under the bed', Ex). | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 7) | |||
| A reaction: This seems horribly nitpicking to many people, but I love it - because it is just true, and it is a truth right at the basis of the confusions in our talk. Analytic philosophy forever! [P.S. 'Tiddles is a cat' - the 'is' membership] |
| Ch. 8 | p.50 | 3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? |
| Full Idea: With the thesis that to be as such is to be relative, the absolutist may be found to concur, but the issue turns on what it might be that a thing is supposed to be relative to. Why not itself? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 8) |
| Ch.11 | p.70 | 3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent |
| Full Idea: 'Existence' can't be glossed as self-identical (critics say) because Pegasus, even while being self-identical, fails to exist. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.11) |
| Ch.13 | p.89 | 3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics |
| Full Idea: Set theory offers the promise of a complete mathematization of the 'is' of predication. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
| Ch.13 | p.90 | 3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it |
| Full Idea: Set inclusion is sharply distinguished from set membership (as the set of Greeks is found to be included in, but not a member of, the set of men). | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
| Ch.13 | p.94 | 3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? |
| Full Idea: As our bible, the Book of Science is presumed to contain only true sentences, but it is less clear how they are to be construed, which literally and which non-literally. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
| Ch.14 | p.99 | 3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations |
| Full Idea: The Negative numbers are postulated (magic word) to solve x=5-8, Rationals postulated to solve 2x=3, Irrationals for x-squared=2, and Imaginaries for x-squared=-1. (…and Zero for x=5-5) …and x/0 remains eternally open. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.14) |
| Ch.15 | p.109 | 3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic |
| Full Idea: The Greeks saw the independent science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.15) |
| Ch.16 | p.119 | 3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions |
| Full Idea: Rationalists have been happier with an ontology of points, and empiricists with an ontology of regions. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.16) |
| Ch.17 | p.124 | 3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms |
| Full Idea: Zermelo proposed seven axioms for set theory, with Fraenkel adding others, to produce the standard Z-F Intuition. | |||
| From: report of José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| Ch.17 | p.130 | 3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) |
| Full Idea: One approaches the natural numbers in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory). | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) |
| Ch.18 | p.131 | 3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' |
| Full Idea: Logical positivism has been concisely summarised as 'there is no synthetic a priori'. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.18 | p.135 | 3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic |
| Full Idea: No one thinks that the proposition that something exists that transcends all possible experience harbours a logical inconsistency. Its denial cannot therefore be an analytic proposition, so it must be synthetic, though only knowable on a priori grounds. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.18 | p.136 | 3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge |
| Full Idea: Appeals to intuition - no matter how informal - can hardly fail to smack of the synthetic a priori. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.18 | p.139 | 3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects |
| Full Idea: Assume that we know to be true propositions of the form 'There are exactly x prime numbers between y and z', and synthetic a priori truths about Platonic objects are delivered to us on a silver platter. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
| Ch.20 | p.146 | 3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? |
| Full Idea: Is being a horse an essential property of a horse? Can we so much as conceive the abstract possibility of a horse's ceasing to be a horse even while continuing to exist? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.20) |
| Ch.21 | p.156 | 3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water |
| Full Idea: One can step into the same river twice, but one must not expect to step into the same water. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.21) |
| Ch.22 | p.172 | 3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results |
| Full Idea: Analytical philosophy excels in the piecemeal analysis of causation, perception, knowledge and so on, but there is a striking poverty of any synoptic vision of these independent studies. | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
| Ch.22 | p.174 | 3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? |
| Full Idea: How can you learn of the existence of transcendent Platonic objects if there is no causal interaction with them? | |||
| From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |