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Ideas of Donald Davidson, by Text

[American, 1917 - 2003, Born at Springfield, Massachusetts. Pupil of Willard Quine. Professor at the University of Chicago.]

1963 Action, Reasons and Causes
p.4 20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Wilson/Schpall]
p.103 23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Smith,M]
p.113 23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M]
p.116 20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Stout,R]
p.123 20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Stout,R]
p.127 3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Kim]
p.185 7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Macdonald,C]
p.259 6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Lowe]
p.3-4 p.34 20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate
1967 Causal Relations
p.8 10371 Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Schaffer,J]
p.77 4778 A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Psillos]
p.440 8403 Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H]
§3 p.157 8346 Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
§4 p.161 8347 Explanations typically relate statements, not events
§4 p.162 8348 If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk
§4 p.162 8349 The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk
1967 The Logical Form of Action Sentences
p.122 15002 If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Sider]
p.144 7771 We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Lycan]
§8 p.208 8860 Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo]
1967 Truth and Meaning
p.82 6179 Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn]
p.142 7769 You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Lycan]
p.146 7772 Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Lycan]
p.246 7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Miller,A]
p.35 p.35 7332 There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form
1969 The Individuation of Events
p.38 18914 Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Engelbretsen]
p.113 9843 You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett]
p.163 8278 The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe]
3 p.87 14602 Events can only be individuated causally [Schaffer,J]
Intro IIb p.7 14004 We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Bourne]
1969 True to the Facts
p.2 8188 Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Dummett]
1970 Mental Events
p.5 2307 Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Kim]
p.8 5497 Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Lycan]
p.33 6620 Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Lowe]
p.62 4081 Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Crane]
p.92 2321 If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Kim]
p.137 3404 Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Kim]
p.138 3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Kim]
p.196 3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Maslin]
p.198 3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Maslin]
p.202 3529 Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Maslin]
p.218 3429 Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Kim]
I p.214 16041 Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
p.217 p.217 4983 There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene
1970 Semantics for Natural Languages
p.45 15160 Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Soames]
2 p.229 14612 Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Smart]
1973 In Defence of Convention T
p.276 7331 A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Macey]
1973 Freedom to Act
p.112 19698 Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Neta]
1973 The Material Mind
p.259 p.259 6386 In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences
1974 The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme
p.11 p.39 19044 Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true
p.184 p.184 6399 Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes
p.184 p.184 6398 Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background
p.189 p.189 6400 Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism
1975 Thought and Talk
p.14 p.14 6394 The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning
p.17 p.17 6395 An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use
p.170 p.170 11145 Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken
p.170 p.170 11144 Concepts are only possible in a language community
p.20 p.20 6396 A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief
p.22 p.22 6397 The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community
p.8 p.8 6392 Thought depends on speech
p.9 p.9 6393 A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech
1977 The Method of Truth in Metaphysics
§II p.295 4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain
§III p.303 4042 Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time
1977 Reality without Reference
p.132 p.132 6387 A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth
p.134 p.134 6388 Is reference the key place where language and the world meet?
p.135 p.135 6389 To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically
p.136 p.136 6390 With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language
p.137 p.137 6391 A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible
1978 Intending
p.8 20024 Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Wilson/Schpall]
p.99 p.120 20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
1978 What Metaphors Mean
p.29 p.29 7775 Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules
p.30 p.30 7776 Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean
p.40 p.40 7777 We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false
1980 Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events'
p.xi p.-6 6384 The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will
p.xi p.-6 6383 Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate
p.xii p.-5 6385 The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best
1983 Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge
p.3 19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Donnellan]
p.34 8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell]
16.6 p.171 18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Button]
I.6 p.14 8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [McDowell]
p.156 p.156 8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs
p.157 p.157 8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them
p.158 p.158 8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence
p.161 p.161 8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects
p.162 p.162 8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality
1987 Knowing One's Own Mind
p.144 6175 External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Rowlands]
1987 Problems in the Explanation of Action
p.120 20074 We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Stout,R]
1990 Epistemology Externalized
p.197 p.197 8872 It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority
p.198 p.198 8873 The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant?
p.199 p.199 8874 It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content
1990 The Structure and Content of Truth
p.304 p.23 18902 Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to
1991 Three Varieties of Knowledge
p.124 10346 Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Dummett]
p.127 10347 Objectivity is intersubjectivity
p.207 p.207 8866 If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me
p.209 p.209 8867 A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality
p.209 p.209 8868 Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication
p.211 p.211 8869 The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers
p.213 p.213 8870 Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds
1994 Davidson on himself
p.231 p.231 3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws
p.231 p.231 3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties
p.231 p.231 3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
p.231 p.231 3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events
p.231 p.231 3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events
p.231 p.231 3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible
p.231 p.231 3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world
p.232 p.232 3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought
p.232 p.232 3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard
p.232 p.232 3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them
p.233 p.233 3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others
p.233 p.233 3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do
p.233 p.233 3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean
p.234 p.234 3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless
p.235 p.235 3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant
1997 Truth Rehabilitated
p.10 p.10 23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language
P.11 p.11 23288 When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?
p.13 p.13 23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding
p.13 p.13 23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions
p.16 p.16 23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world
p.16 p.16 23291 Without truth, both language and thought are impossible
p.3 p.3 23284 Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true
p.5 p.5 23285 If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves)
P.6 p.6 23286 Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it
1998 Replies to Critics
p.323 p.323 18702 Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling
1999 The Folly of Trying to Define Truth
p.20 p.20 23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge
p.21 p.21 23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler
p.21 p.21 23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts
p.23 p.23 23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite
p.25 p.25 23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory
2005 Truth and Predication
Intro p.1 19131 We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
Intro p.2 19132 Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
Intro p.4 19133 If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
1 p.17 19136 Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
1 p.27 19139 Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
2 p.30 19140 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
2 p.32 19142 Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
2 p.33 19144 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
2 p.34 19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
2 p.34 19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
2 p.35 19147 Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
2 p.39 19148 There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
2 p.41 19149 If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
2 p.43 19150 Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
2 p.48 19151 Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
3 p.50 19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
3 p.55 19153 Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
3 p.62 19154 The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
4 p.96 19156 Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
5 p.102 19158 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
6 p.121 19160 A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
6 p.123 19161 We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth
6 p.123 19162 Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
6 p.124 19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
6 p.128 19166 The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
6 p.128 19167 Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
7 p.145 19169 Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
7 p.150 19170 Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
7 p.153 19172 To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
7 p.158 19173 Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
7 p.160 19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
7 p.161 19176 The concept of truth can explain predication