1963 | Action, Reasons and Causes |
p.4 | 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action |
p.116 | 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention |
p.123 | 20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons |
p.127 | 3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it |
p.185 | 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it |
p.259 | 6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons |
p.3-4 | p.34 | 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate |
1967 | Causal Relations |
p.77 | 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law |
p.440 | 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events |
§3 | p.157 | 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity |
§4 | p.161 | 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events |
§4 | p.162 | 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk |
§4 | p.162 | 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk |
1967 | The Logical Form of Action Sentences |
p.122 | 15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events |
p.144 | 7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events |
§8 | p.208 | 8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events |
1967 | Truth and Meaning |
p.82 | 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? |
p.142 | 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time |
p.146 | 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature |
p.246 | 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning |
p.35 | p.35 | 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form |
1969 | The Individuation of Events |
p.38 | 18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events |
p.113 | 9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first |
p.163 | 8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular |
3 | p.87 | 14602 | Events can only be individuated causally |
Intro IIb | p.7 | 14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs |
1969 | True to the Facts |
p.2 | 8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences |
1970 | Mental Events |
p.8 | 5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative |
p.33 | 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation |
p.62 | 4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties |
p.137 | 3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible |
p.138 | 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties |
p.196 | 3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events |
p.198 | 3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described |
I | p.214 | 16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical |
p.217 | p.217 | 4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene |
1970 | Semantics for Natural Languages |
p.45 | 15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead |
2 | p.229 | 14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic |
1973 | In Defence of Convention T |
p.276 | 7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic |
1973 | Freedom to Act |
p.112 | 19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed |
1973 | The Material Mind |
p.259 | p.259 | 6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences |
1974 | The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme |
p.11 | p.39 | 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true |
p.184 | p.184 | 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background |
p.184 | p.184 | 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes |
p.189 | p.189 | 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism |
1975 | Thought and Talk |
p.14 | p.14 | 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning |
p.17 | p.17 | 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use |
p.170 | p.170 | 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community |
p.170 | p.170 | 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken |
p.20 | p.20 | 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief |
p.22 | p.22 | 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community. |
p.8 | p.8 | 6392 | Thought depends on speech |
p.9 | p.9 | 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech |
1977 | The Method of Truth in Metaphysics |
§II | p.295 | 4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain |
§III | p.303 | 4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time |
1977 | Reality without Reference |
p.132 | p.132 | 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth |
p.134 | p.134 | 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? |
p.135 | p.135 | 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically |
p.136 | p.136 | 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language |
p.137 | p.137 | 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible |
1978 | Intending |
p.8 | 20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive |
p.99 | p.120 | 20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable |
1978 | What Metaphors Mean |
p.29 | p.29 | 7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules |
p.30 | p.30 | 7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean |
p.40 | p.40 | 7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false |
1980 | Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' |
p.xi | p.-6 | 6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will |
p.xi | p.-6 | 6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate |
p.xii | p.-5 | 6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best |
1983 | Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge |
p.3 | 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds |
p.34 | 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally |
16.6 | p.171 | 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' |
I.6 | p.14 | 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons |
p.156 | p.156 | 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs |
p.157 | p.157 | 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them |
p.158 | p.158 | 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence |
p.161 | p.161 | 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects |
p.162 | p.162 | 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality |
1987 | Knowing One's Own Mind |
p.144 | 6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn |
1990 | Epistemology Externalized |
p.197 | p.197 | 8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority |
p.198 | p.198 | 8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? |
p.199 | p.199 | 8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content |
1990 | The Structure and Content of Truth |
p.304 | p.23 | 18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to |
1991 | Three Varieties of Knowledge |
p.124 | 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world |
p.127 | 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity |
p.207 | p.207 | 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me |
p.209 | p.209 | 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality |
p.209 | p.209 | 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication |
p.211 | p.211 | 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers |
p.213 | p.213 | 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds |
1994 | Davidson on himself |
p.231 | p.231 | 3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws |
p.231 | p.231 | 3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible |
p.231 | p.231 | 3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world |
p.231 | p.231 | 3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events |
p.231 | p.231 | 3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events |
p.231 | p.231 | 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism |
p.231 | p.231 | 3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties |
p.232 | p.232 | 3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard |
p.232 | p.232 | 3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought |
p.232 | p.232 | 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them |
p.233 | p.233 | 3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do |
p.233 | p.233 | 3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others |
p.233 | p.233 | 3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean |
p.234 | p.234 | 3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless |
p.235 | p.235 | 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant |
1998 | Replies to Critics |
p.323 | p.323 | 18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling |
2005 | Truth and Predication |
Intro | p.1 | 19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts |
Intro | p.2 | 19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage |
Intro | p.4 | 19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole |
1 | p.15 | 19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages |
1 | p.17 | 19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning |
1 | p.17 | 19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages |
1 | p.27 | 19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning |
1 | p.27 | 19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common |
2 | p.30 | 19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference |
2 | p.32 | 19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature |
2 | p.33 | 19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify |
2 | p.34 | 19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth |
2 | p.34 | 19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? |
2 | p.35 | 19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language |
2 | p.39 | 19148 | There is nothng interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to |
2 | p.41 | 19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' |
2 | p.43 | 19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief |
2 | p.48 | 19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard |
3 | p.50 | 19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker |
3 | p.55 | 19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler |
3 | p.62 | 19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants |
4 | p.96 | 19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places |
5 | p.102 | 19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' |
6 | p.121 | 19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication |
6 | p.123 | 19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth |
6 | p.123 | 19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed |
6 | p.124 | 19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it |
6 | p.125 | 19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable |
6 | p.128 | 19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing |
6 | p.128 | 19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence |
7 | p.145 | 19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences |
7 | p.150 | 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote |
7 | p.153 | 19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language |
7 | p.158 | 19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help |
7 | p.160 | 19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth |
7 | p.160 | 19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths |
7 | p.161 | 19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication |