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Ideas of Rosalind Hursthouse, by Text

[New Zealand, fl. 1996, Of the Open University in Britain, and then Auckland University, NZ]

1992 Virtue Theory and Abortion
p.226 p.81 Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce
1999 On Virtue Ethics
Intro p.9 Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia
Intro p.15 Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?
Ch.1 p.33 Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply
Ch.1 p.37 Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical
Ch.2 p.44 After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret
Ch.2 p.52 Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent
Ch.2 p.56 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom
Ch.2 p.56 Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues
Ch.2 p.57 Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases
Ch.2 n12 p.60 Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences
Ch.3 p.64 Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases
Ch.3 p.69 According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right
Ch.3 p.74 Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life
Ch.3 p.83 We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples
Ch.3 n8 p.73 You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest
Ch.4 p.102 The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well
Ch.6 p.127 Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action
Ch.6 p.133 If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith?
Ch.6 p.137 It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous
Ch.7 p.141 Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful'
Ch.7 p.144 If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally?
Ch.7 p.147 Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue
Ch.7 p.150 There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends
Ch.7 p.155 We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly
Ch.8 p.172 Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia
Ch.8 p.176 When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet
Ch.9 p.202 Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group
Ch.9 p.213 Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others
Ch.9 n20 p.206 The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being?
Ch10 p.222 We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons