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Ideas of Peter F. Strawson, by Text

[British, 1919 - 2006, Father of Galen Strawson. Professor at Oxford University.]

1950 On Referring
p.37 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it
p.402 Reference is mainly a social phenomenon
p.535 If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context
1 p.65 Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion
2 p.68 Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer
2 p.68 The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert
2 p.70 If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something
5 p.85 There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist
1950 Truth
1 p.449 The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement
2 p.452 The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world
2 p.453 Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say
2 p.453 The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining
1959 Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics
Intro p.9 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy
Intro p.9 Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure
Intro p.10 Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories
3.4 p.100 I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others
3.4 p.101 A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality
3.4 n1 p.99 The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied
1978 Entity and Identity
I p.34 It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual
I n4 p.38 We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use