2003 | Modality |
Ch.1 | p.2 | 5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions |
Ch.1 | p.19 | 5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives |
Ch.2 | p.21 | 5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact |
Ch.2 | p.21 | 5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly |
Ch.2 | p.22 | 5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets |
Ch.2 | p.28 | 5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? |
Ch.2 | p.31 | 5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible |
Ch.2 | p.40 | 5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position |
Ch.2 | p.48 | 5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid |
Ch.2 | p.49 | 5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers |
Ch.2 | p.62 | 5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal |
Ch.3 | p.63 | 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism |
Ch.3 | p.63 | 5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) |
Ch.3 n 11 | p.177 | 5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities |
Ch.5 | p.101 | 5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility |
Ch.6 | p.123 | 5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books |
Ch.6 | p.129 | 5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together |
Ch.7 | p.155 | 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books |