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Ideas of Katherine Hawley, by Text

[British, fl. 2001, Lecturer at the University of St Andrew's.]

2001 How Things Persist
1.2 p.13 Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts
1.3 p.15 Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties
1.5 p.21 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property
1.7 p.34 Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one
1.8 p.35 Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time
1.8 p.35 How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves?
2.1 p.38 If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large!
2.1 p.40 Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat?
2.2 p.42 Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing
2.2 p.43 The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time
2.3 p.46 Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects
2.3 p.46 Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object
2.3 p.47 The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to
2.4 p.48 Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage
2.5 p.51 Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals)
2.7 p.58 Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range
3.2 p.73 A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience
3.4.1 p.78 An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages)
3.5 p.85 Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations
3.5 p.87 Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds?
3.8 p.97 Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity
3.8 p.98 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity
3.9 p.99 On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves
4.1 p.101 Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality
4.1 p.102 Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all
4.1 p.104 Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved
4.14 p.138 Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons
4.2 p.105 Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases
4.5 p.116 Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations?
4.9 p.124 If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other
5 p.141 Philosophers are good at denying the obvious
5.1 p.146 Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread
5.1 p.146 The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place
5.1 p.147 Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin
5.5 p.156 An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations
5.8 p.163 If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing?
6 p.177 The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue?
6.10 p.191 If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was?
6.2 p.179 Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums
6.2 p.180 To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept