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Ideas of Fraser MacBride, by Text

[British, fl. 2004, Reader at Birkbeck College, London, then at Cambridge.]

2007 Structuralism Reconsidered
1 p.563 Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function
3 p.585 For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first
2013 Truthmakers
1.1 p.3 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth
1.6 p.10 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'?
1.6 p.10 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation
2.1 p.11 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker
2.1.1 p.11 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker. Reductio suggests it can't have
2.1.3 p.12 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts
2.1.4 p.13 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') p.14 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours p.14 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths p.14 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth p.16 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?
2.2 p.17 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein
2.2 p.18 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths
2.4.1 p.20 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters
3.1 p.22 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers
3.1 p.22 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent
3.3 p.23 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
3.7 p.26 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings
3.7 p.26 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?
3.8 p.27 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification