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Ideas of Alex Orenstein, by Text
[American, fl. 2002, Professor at the City University of New York.]
Ch.2

p.15

8452

Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims

Ch.2

p.27

8454

The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root2 etc.

Ch.2

p.36

8457

The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs

Ch.3

p.44

8458

Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism

Ch.3

p.55

8465

Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory

Ch.3

p.70

8471

Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way

Ch.5

p.98

8472

Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable)

Ch.5

p.99

8474

Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete

Ch.5

p.99

8473

The logicists held that isamemberof is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic

Ch.5

p.103

8475

The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance

Ch.5

p.109

8476

Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role

Ch.6

p.121

8477

People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference

Ch.7

p.151

8480

S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p'

Ch.7

p.171

8484

If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions
