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Ideas of Edwin D. Mares, by Text

[New Zealand, fl. 2001, Lecturer at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand.]

2011 A Priori
01.5 p.6 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another
02.2 p.16 Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements
02.3 p.17 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components
02.9 p.31 Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them
02.9 p.31 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so
03.01 p.34 Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights
03.10 p.49 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations?
06.7 p.97 Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size
08.1 p.123 Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience
08.2 p.125 After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments
08.9 p.135 Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason
11.4 p.178 The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied
11.7 p.182 Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience
2014 Negation
1 p.181 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence
1 p.181 Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system
1 p.182 The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory
1 p.182 Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system
2.2 p.183 In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws
2.2 p.184 Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic
2.2 p.185 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation
3.1 p.185 Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition
5.1 p.196 For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting
5.5 p.200 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction
5.5 p.202 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation
6.1 p.204 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations
6.2 p.206 Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations
7.1 p.208 Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications