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Ideas of Robert Hanna, by Text

[American, fl. 2006, Professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder.]

2006 Rationality and Logic
Intro p.-11 Most psychologists are now cognitivists
Intro p.-6 Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths
Intro p.-6 Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence
Intro p.-6 Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths
1.1 p.3 Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition
1.1 p.6 Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction
1.2 p.9 Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences
1.2 p.11 Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection
1.6 p.25 Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals
2.1 p.31 Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible
2.2 p.31 Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts
2.4 p.37 Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity
4.0 p.77 Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity
4.9 p.110 One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic
5.3 p.134 Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability
5.4 p.141 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ
5.4 p.141 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ
5.7 p.151 Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core
6.4 p.173 Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences
6.4 p.175 Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential
6.5 p.186 Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception
6.6 p.193 Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions
6.6 p.194 Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery?
6.6 p.196 A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds
6.6 p.196 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences)
6.6 p.196 Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws
6.6 p.196 Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts
7.3 p.218 Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology
7.3 p.218 We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies