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Ideas of Amie L. Thomasson, by Text

[American, fl. 2009, Professor at the University of Miami.]

2007 Ordinary Objects
Intro p.3 A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview
Intro p.4 Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought
01.2 p.16 Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules
02.3 p.38 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims?
02.3 p.38 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to
03 p.57 Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified
03 p.57 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category
03.2 p.62 Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic
03.3 p.68 To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people
03.4 p.68 Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world
03.5 p.71 Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile
04.3 p.80 If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses
04.4 p.81 Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties?
09 p.152 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
09.3 p.157 Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair'
09.3 p.159 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met
09.4 p.162 Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building'
09.4 p.167 You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it
09.4 p.167 Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts
10 p.177 Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them
11.2 p.193 Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way