| 2008 | Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology |
| 'Grounding' | p.123 | 18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker |
| 'Grounding' | p.125 | 18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc |
| 'Grounding' | p.125 | 18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world |
| 'Max and Nec' | p.107 | 18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? |
| 'Max and Nec' | p.107 | 18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth |
| 'Max and Nec' | p.107 | 18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded |
| 'Max and Nec' | p.108 | 18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers |
| 'Max and Nec' | p.108 | 18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable |
| 'Max and Nec' | p.110 | 18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds |
| 'Max and Nec' | p.112 | 18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists |
| 'Realism' | p.116 | 18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers |
| 'Realism' | p.117 | 18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true |
| 'Realism' | p.121 | 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things |
| 'Realism' | p.122 | 18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features |
| 2009 | Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties |
| 'Analysis' | p.273 | 15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings |
| 'Intro' | p.265 | 15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently |
| 'Personal' | p.267 | 15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one |
| 'Truthmakers' | p.267 | 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths |
| 'Truthmakers' | p.267 | 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? |
| 2010 | On the Source of Necessity |
| 2 | p.140 | 15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) |
| 2 | p.142 | 15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent |
| 4 | p.149 | 15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically |
| 2011 | Truthmaking for Presentists |
| 2 | p.59 | 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature |
| 3 | p.64 | 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property |
| 4 | p.70 | 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths |
| 4 | p.72 | 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? |
| 4 | p.76 | 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! |
| 4 | p.77 | 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' |
| 4 n24 | p.75 | 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have |
| 6 | p.82 | 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate |
| 6 | p.85 | 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation |