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Ideas of Berit Brogaard, by Text

[American, fl. 2006, At the University of Missouri, St Louis.]

2009 Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth
p.223 p.147 If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self
     Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation.
     From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,J - The Inessential Indexical 08.2
     A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical.