18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories |
18004 | We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... |
10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Quine] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones |