| 3534 | To be is to have causal powers |
| Full Idea: To be is to have causal powers. | |
| From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927], §4), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation | |
| A reaction: This is sometimes called Alexander's Principle. It is first found in Plato, and is popular with physicalists, but there are problem cases... A thing needs to exist in order to have causal powers. To exist is more than to be perceived. |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless |
| Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve. | |
| From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129 | |
| A reaction: An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects. |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished |
| Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished. | |
| From: Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV | |
| A reaction: Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system. |