| 78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious |
| 5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes |
| 19693 | There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Whitcomb] |
| 11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Politis] |
| 548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom |
| 2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel] |
| 103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps |
| 545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular |
| 549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas |
| 1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable |
| 1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive |
| 609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles |
| 624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking |
| 572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry |
| 22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance |
| 21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts |
| 2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" |
| 11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes |
| 17949 | Inquiry is the cause of philosophy |
| 12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Annas] |
| 559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful |
| 112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument |
| 22521 | Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole |
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further |
| 22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible |
| 76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary |
| 23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire |
| 2676 | Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner |
| 11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Politis] |
| 1570 | Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos |
| 1575 | For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik] |
| 24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration |
| 5082 | Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars |
| 1574 | Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right |
| 2675 | Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements |
| 1589 | Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik] |
| 1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular |
| 2801 | Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave |
| 623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience |
| 19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food |
| 23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways |
| 6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) |
| 1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik] |
| 11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man |
| 11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Politis] |
| 1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time |
| 4333 | Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another |
| 1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil |
| 1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) |
| 1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? |
| 24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary |
| 1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another |
| 608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety |
| 627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? |
| 628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? |
| 5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions |
| 2677 | Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction |
| 2674 | Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions |
| 10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition |
| 10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity |
| 10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? |
| 16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised |
| 8200 | Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Quine] |
| 12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal |
| 12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough |
| 12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Witt] |
| 9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different |
| 10944 | A definition must be of something primary |
| 596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition |
| 16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not |
| 12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Wedin] |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things |
| 4385 | Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Urmson] |
| 12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner |
| 12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white |
| 11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind |
| 10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae |
| 12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae |
| 17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too |
| 12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Wedin] |
| 12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Witt] |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many |
| 12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse |
| 12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Witt] |
| 11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing |
| 15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given |
| 574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress |
| 22529 | Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) |
| 22571 | 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small |
| 11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind |
| 10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking |
| 10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together |
| 10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations |
| 21356 | Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends |
| 575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth |
| 15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true |
| 10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that |
| 18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing |
| 1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary |
| 35 | A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it |
| 1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are |
| 586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't |
| 19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Davidson] |
| 22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter] |
| 9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values |
| 22271 | Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Potter] |
| 11060 | Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Hanna] |
| 18909 | Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Engelbretsen] |
| 8080 | Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Devlin] |
| 13912 | Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 8071 | Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Devlin] |
| 13819 | Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock] |
| 1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything |
| 562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? |
| 573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy |
| 9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms |
| 13270 | Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? |
| 13282 | Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Koslicki] |
| 12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle |
| 11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects |
| 12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case |
| 11148 | Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows |
| 21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Williamson] |
| 22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Boulter] |
| 1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false |
| 12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly |
| 4730 | For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [O'Grady] |
| 18896 | Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Sommers] |
| 16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't |
| 3300 | Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Benardete,JA] |
| 11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate |
| 8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Devlin] |
| 13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Leibniz] |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides |
| 11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty |
| 11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Politis] |
| 11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Politis] |
| 11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Politis] |
| 11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Politis] |
| 11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Politis] |
| 11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Politis] |
| 11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Politis] |
| 11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Politis] |
| 11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Politis] |
| 11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Politis] |
| 11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Politis] |
| 11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Politis] |
| 11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Politis] |
| 11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Politis] |
| 11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Politis] |
| 12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties |
| 560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things |
| 9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible |
| 9790 | Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature |
| 12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles |
| 1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity |
| 13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things |
| 10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? |
| 11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two |
| 22962 | Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible |
| 11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous |
| 12074 | The one in number just is the particular |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number |
| 12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible |
| 17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle |
| 17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised |
| 17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible |
| 17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves |
| 646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? |
| 18090 | Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end |
| 22929 | Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Le Poidevin] |
| 13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual |
| 22930 | Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Le Poidevin] |
| 18833 | A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points |
| 11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space |
| 17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity |
| 17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one |
| 17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number |
| 9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion |
| 13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort |
| 12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Badiou] |
| 9974 | Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten |
| 13221 | Existence is either potential or actual |
| 568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances |
| 12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Wedin] |
| 11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aquinas] |
| 15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being |
| 611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy |
| 11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else |
| 1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought |
| 11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis] |
| 11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Politis] |
| 11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Politis] |
| 11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Politis] |
| 11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Politis] |
| 11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Politis] |
| 566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? |
| 16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Gill,ML] |
| 570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' |
| 12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent |
| 10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality |
| 16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance |
| 11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Politis] |
| 13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Schaffer,J] |
| 5105 | The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time |
| 1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology |
| 16115 | Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially |
| 22960 | The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace |
| 16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities |
| 16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change |
| 12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' |
| 1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place |
| 16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things |
| 13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa |
| 15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process |
| 17262 | Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence |
| 18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence |
| 24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order |
| 11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa |
| 12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals |
| 11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Politis] |
| 11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things |
| 3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA] |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity |
| 13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Westerhoff] |
| 12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science |
| 16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Gill,ML] |
| 16656 | The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here |
| 21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Heil] |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) |
| 16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Frede,M] |
| 15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Koslicki] |
| 7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Macdonald,C] |
| 16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Frede,M] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing |
| 18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes |
| 7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Jacquette] |
| 11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject |
| 11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances |
| 16644 | The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects |
| 10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal |
| 16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Pasnau] |
| 10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? |
| 5117 | Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up |
| 16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing |
| 16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Gill,ML] |
| 15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process |
| 11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Politis] |
| 16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter |
| 16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality |
| 15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical |
| 11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it |
| 15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things |
| 15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! |
| 11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared |
| 12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Witt] |
| 1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential |
| 649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals |
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars |
| 10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior |
| 16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? |
| 633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them |
| 643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? |
| 647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular |
| 9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy |
| 27 | Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness |
| 5130 | It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' |
| 28 | How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? |
| 1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations |
| 642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? |
| 16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves |
| 16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities |
| 605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement |
| 618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement |
| 640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any |
| 641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? |
| 4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Moreland] |
| 645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled |
| 5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous |
| 16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Frede,M] |
| 16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Frede,M] |
| 16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities |
| 10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' |
| 11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation |
| 12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Wiggins] |
| 16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Frede,M] |
| 12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Wedin] |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do |
| 16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause |
| 1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? |
| 17041 | Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements |
| 16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Frede,M] |
| 590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations |
| 10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing |
| 603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? |
| 17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process |
| 17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance |
| 17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing |
| 13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible |
| 17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought |
| 17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position |
| 17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing |
| 16172 | Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it |
| 16623 | We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed |
| 16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Gill,ML] |
| 11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Politis] |
| 1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) |
| 11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties |
| 24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being |
| 615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance |
| 569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance |
| 12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Witt] |
| 11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Politis] |
| 11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Politis] |
| 592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance |
| 599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances |
| 16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Frede,M] |
| 10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Lawson-Tancred] |
| 11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances |
| 1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position |
| 600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear |
| 16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Pasnau] |
| 16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Gill,ML] |
| 8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Lowe] |
| 12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else |
| 11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence |
| 12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing |
| 10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying |
| 595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] |
| 11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness |
| 10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object |
| 12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Witt] |
| 12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being |
| 11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Politis] |
| 12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Witt] |
| 607 | None of the universals can be a substance |
| 16174 | A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape |
| 16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Gill,ML] |
| 10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' |
| 16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality |
| 17043 | Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential |
| 13276 | The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Koslicki] |
| 24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account |
| 24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual |
| 16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Frede,M] |
| 12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Wedin] |
| 16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Frede,M] |
| 12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Witt] |
| 11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Politis] |
| 12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Witt] |
| 16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Gill,ML] |
| 16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Frede,M] |
| 16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Gill,ML] |
| 12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Kung] |
| 11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being |
| 16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Gill,ML] |
| 15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle |
| 16970 | A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too |
| 16104 | Unity of the form is just unity of the definition |
| 13277 | The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Koslicki] |
| 16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form |
| 16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Gill,ML] |
| 11255 | In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Politis] |
| 12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration |
| 12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form |
| 16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Gill,ML] |
| 12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Fine,K] |
| 12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Witt] |
| 12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Witt] |
| 597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? |
| 16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production |
| 10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Lawson-Tancred] |
| 16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality |
| 16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Gill,ML] |
| 10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? |
| 13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole |
| 15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it |
| 15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? |
| 9071 | We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it |
| 16791 | There is no whole except for the parts |
| 22525 | The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole |
| 12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Simons] |
| 16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants |
| 11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aquinas] |
| 12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Copi] |
| 11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Politis] |
| 11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Politis] |
| 12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Witt] |
| 11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence |
| 12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate |
| 12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Witt] |
| 12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Witt] |
| 12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Witt] |
| 11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Kung] |
| 12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Witt] |
| 11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Politis] |
| 16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Gill,ML] |
| 17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular |
| 12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences |
| 10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Lawson-Tancred] |
| 11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Politis] |
| 12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Witt] |
| 11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition |
| 11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature |
| 12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind |
| 10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Lawson-Tancred] |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence |
| 17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it |
| 15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Koslicki] |
| 16972 | The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Moravcsik] |
| 5084 | A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability |
| 12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Wedin] |
| 11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Kung] |
| 11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Politis] |
| 16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality |
| 16149 | Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing |
| 16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter |
| 16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species |
| 12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Wedin] |
| 12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Witt] |
| 16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Frede,M] |
| 16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force |
| 16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Gill,ML] |
| 12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Witt] |
| 12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Witt] |
| 16173 | Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration |
| 17042 | Natural things are their own source of stability through change |
| 16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Frede,M] |
| 16691 | A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring |
| 16574 | Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence |
| 16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? |
| 16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing |
| 13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be |
| 13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin |
| 11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Politis] |
| 12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Witt] |
| 11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing |
| 17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same |
| 3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA] |
| 16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object |
| 17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter |
| 11840 | Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same |
| 12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise |
| 12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible |
| 1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity |
| 14641 | A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims |
| 17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction |
| 22518 | The actual must be possible, because it occurred |
| 15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false |
| 15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence |
| 11254 | Matter is potentiality [Politis] |
| 14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances |
| 15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing |
| 15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality |
| 15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them |
| 13108 | Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice |
| 13110 | Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary |
| 13106 | Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings |
| 22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four |
| 12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities |
| 15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Koslicki] |
| 5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Code] |
| 12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge |
| 12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Witt] |
| 12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Witt] |
| 547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge |
| 22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge |
| 22587 | Understanding is the aim of our nature |
| 12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity |
| 12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable |
| 12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation |
| 4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth |
| 1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true |
| 544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals |
| 10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind |
| 546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience |
| 1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know |
| 2573 | To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence |
| 11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Politis] |
| 5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written |
| 1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? |
| 1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? |
| 1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite |
| 1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing |
| 17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Mares] |
| 16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong |
| 12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception |
| 16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? |
| 1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses |
| 1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible |
| 16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced |
| 1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided |
| 5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation |
| 23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Frede,M] |
| 1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind |
| 543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses |
| 1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given |
| 23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Frede,M] |
| 22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed |
| 95 | If everyone believes it, it is true |
| 79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved |
| 16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Gill,ML] |
| 9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience |
| 8331 | To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause |
| 1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable |
| 1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind |
| 583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof |
| 581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! |
| 584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation |
| 585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? |
| 576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former |
| 24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions |
| 16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties |
| 24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Koslicki] |
| 17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Koslicki] |
| 21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi] |
| 12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding |
| 1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions |
| 10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself |
| 12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term |
| 12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations |
| 12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions |
| 12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible |
| 1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar |
| 12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities |
| 1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes |
| 1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties |
| 1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions |
| 12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths |
| 11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type |
| 5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary |
| 16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Moravcsik] |
| 5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals |
| 1683 | We learn universals from many particulars |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? |
| 11243 | Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Politis] |
| 12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? |
| 12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain |
| 12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest |
| 11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable |
| 5080 | We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements |
| 1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose |
| 1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity |
| 11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible |
| 16969 | Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose |
| 11250 | Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Politis] |
| 12045 | Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Annas] |
| 16968 | There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question |
| 3320 | Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Benardete,JA] |
| 11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Politis] |
| 13109 | Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually |
| 12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Wedin] |
| 22522 | To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins |
| 1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes |
| 15119 | Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences [Koslicki] |
| 22524 | The nature of each thing is its mature state |
| 12000 | Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Kung] |
| 16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line |
| 16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences |
| 11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location |
| 16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence |
| 11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance |
| 11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Kung] |
| 1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive |
| 1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality |
| 5146 | Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence |
| 5147 | In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous |
| 5148 | The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people |
| 5232 | If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason |
| 5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Martin/Barresi] |
| 24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements |
| 12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life |
| 16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end |
| 5145 | The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way |
| 1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity |
| 24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? |
| 1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd |
| 24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts |
| 1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts |
| 23218 | The brain has no responsibility for sensations, which occur in the heart |
| 23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young |
| 20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities |
| 24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them |
| 24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination |
| 18911 | Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Engelbretsen] |
| 9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts |
| 9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised |
| 9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things |
| 16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Frede,M] |
| 9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement |
| 22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it |
| 571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? |
| 5266 | It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self |
| 8007 | Aristotle never discusses free will [MacIntyre] |
| 12961 | For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Leibniz] |
| 4118 | A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children |
| 22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power |
| 22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action |
| 20192 | Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Zagzebski] |
| 1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them |
| 24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling |
| 24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body |
| 24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? |
| 24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached |
| 1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul |
| 2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill] |
| 1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? |
| 13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax |
| 4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul |
| 1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation |
| 22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature |
| 5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others |
| 23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings |
| 4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse] |
| 72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things |
| 23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Sorabji] |
| 23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Frede,M] |
| 23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Sorabji] |
| 23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences |
| 11245 | Many memories make up a single experience |
| 10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men |
| 9789 | You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together |
| 9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions |
| 9788 | Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error |
| 9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things |
| 9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation |
| 9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness |
| 2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Putnam] |
| 5107 | Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection |
| 12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Wedin] |
| 11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself |
| 13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all |
| 11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Politis] |
| 5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics |
| 22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders |
| 1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false |
| 12368 | Negation takes something away from something |
| 1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either |
| 4380 | Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat] |
| 23320 | Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Frede,M] |
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self |
| 4383 | Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat] |
| 68 | The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire |
| 4318 | Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Cottingham] |
| 4372 | Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg] |
| 5254 | Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge |
| 5255 | A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular |
| 23317 | Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Frede,M] |
| 23318 | Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Frede,M] |
| 5257 | Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance |
| 23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure |
| 22574 | A community can lack self-control |
| 24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires |
| 22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination |
| 73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite |
| 4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg] |
| 69 | We deliberate about means, not ends |
| 5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct |
| 80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them |
| 82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues |
| 20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings |
| 5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good |
| 22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point |
| 22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes |
| 67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do |
| 5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices |
| 81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason |
| 20042 | We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it |
| 5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing |
| 5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily |
| 4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin] |
| 22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind |
| 23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Frede,M] |
| 5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death |
| 52 | We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure |
| 5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength |
| 2837 | Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful |
| 636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically |
| 16566 | Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars |
| 2824 | The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual |
| 2846 | Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) |
| 635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement |
| 45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good |
| 46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle |
| 5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation |
| 22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it |
| 5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine |
| 5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function |
| 31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one |
| 5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency |
| 22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes |
| 6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Fogelin] |
| 5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead |
| 5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts |
| 5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R] |
| 21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature |
| 2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust |
| 4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg] |
| 18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else |
| 4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill] |
| 18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake |
| 398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function |
| 33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it |
| 23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use |
| 15772 | A thing's active function is its end |
| 5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health |
| 5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception |
| 5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good |
| 5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life |
| 90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love |
| 5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour |
| 5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful |
| 22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love |
| 101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom |
| 5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds |
| 2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies |
| 3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Annas] |
| 92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others |
| 5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves |
| 2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive |
| 5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them |
| 5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences |
| 20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' |
| 629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? |
| 5110 | Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature |
| 5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves |
| 5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first |
| 5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable |
| 23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure |
| 109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action |
| 5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) |
| 22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits |
| 26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means |
| 25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain |
| 5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods |
| 5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures |
| 18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Orsi] |
| 5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell] |
| 5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster |
| 2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel] |
| 5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself |
| 30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action |
| 5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits |
| 5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt |
| 5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods |
| 39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life |
| 100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness |
| 106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man |
| 5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure |
| 4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg] |
| 4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad |
| 5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body |
| 5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones |
| 383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever |
| 5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? |
| 96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures |
| 98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose |
| 99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort |
| 97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure |
| 5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity |
| 5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished |
| 53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality |
| 49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel |
| 84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought |
| 5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good |
| 91 | A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best |
| 88 | Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity |
| 71 | Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste |
| 5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue |
| 5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others |
| 5111 | All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain |
| 34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue |
| 5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that |
| 4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse] |
| 4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman] |
| 58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions |
| 54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done |
| 4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg] |
| 63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment |
| 5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown |
| 5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action |
| 5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown |
| 107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness |
| 55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just |
| 5876 | Virtue is different from continence |
| 591 | Excellence is a sort of completion |
| 5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral |
| 5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? |
| 5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well |
| 5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function |
| 625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? |
| 4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Achtenberg] |
| 5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round |
| 5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars |
| 3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas] |
| 4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone |
| 5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues |
| 4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful |
| 5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine |
| 56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves |
| 93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness |
| 22557 | Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city |
| 2841 | People become good because of nature, habit and reason |
| 2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue |
| 43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us |
| 44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds |
| 5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity |
| 51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings |
| 4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat] |
| 6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help |
| 57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts |
| 5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant |
| 4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue |
| 5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly |
| 4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument |
| 4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Urmson] |
| 5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness |
| 5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part |
| 22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them |
| 22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions |
| 5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) |
| 60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) |
| 47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean |
| 4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche] |
| 61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean |
| 4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson] |
| 4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson] |
| 62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way |
| 5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong |
| 65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean |
| 5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult |
| 5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes |
| 5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony |
| 3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Annas] |
| 23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them |
| 2829 | The law is the mean |
| 5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning |
| 5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate |
| 23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite |
| 22590 | Virtue is concerned with correct feelings |
| 64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong |
| 4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B] |
| 23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa |
| 5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful |
| 23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate |
| 2813 | It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable |
| 4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson] |
| 23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character |
| 5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness |
| 5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation |
| 5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people |
| 5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice |
| 22553 | Justice is a virtue of communities |
| 5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation |
| 5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death |
| 23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble |
| 24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it |
| 5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good |
| 4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Williams,B] |
| 23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people |
| 5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern |
| 18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain |
| 5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life |
| 105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us |
| 18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? |
| 110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate |
| 111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are |
| 104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man |
| 621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence |
| 5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth |
| 38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless |
| 1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster |
| 5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them |
| 5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy |
| 108 | The virtue of generosity requires money |
| 22561 | The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes |
| 2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM] |
| 2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM] |
| 85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends |
| 23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing |
| 23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people |
| 2808 | Master and slave can have friendship through common interests |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake |
| 5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations |
| 5245 | Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil |
| 5265 | Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being |
| 2803 | Man is by nature a political animal |
| 2820 | People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help |
| 22586 | Only humans have reason |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal |
| 5133 | Man is by nature a social being |
| 22523 | The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient |
| 2805 | A community must share a common view of good and justice |
| 22526 | People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city |
| 22535 | Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions |
| 22584 | A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food |
| 22532 | A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude |
| 22581 | The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed |
| 86 | A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible |
| 5140 | Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens |
| 23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship |
| 22577 | What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? |
| 22578 | The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly |
| 22579 | The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city |
| 22548 | A city aims at living well |
| 2431 | Every state is an association formed for some good purpose |
| 2832 | The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal |
| 5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) |
| 21046 | The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens |
| 22580 | The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life |
| 22546 | A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage |
| 2821 | The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy |
| 22558 | Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim |
| 22566 | The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people |
| 2835 | Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two |
| 2973 | We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution |
| 22544 | A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city |
| 2818 | The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution |
| 22545 | A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man |
| 22563 | The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good |
| 22541 | Kings should be selected according to character |
| 2819 | The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom |
| 22552 | The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy |
| 22542 | People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it |
| 22583 | The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that |
| 5241 | We hold that every piece of legislation is just |
| 22543 | In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices |
| 22539 | Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it |
| 22572 | Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice |
| 87 | Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality |
| 2823 | The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals |
| 2826 | Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few |
| 22567 | Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality |
| 22560 | Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law |
| 22562 | Choosing officials by lot is democratic |
| 22533 | If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling |
| 2817 | It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office |
| 22576 | No office is permanent in a democracy |
| 22549 | In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts |
| 22575 | Ultimate democracy is tyranny |
| 22531 | We aim to understand the best possible community for free people |
| 5260 | Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice |
| 5264 | Friendship is based on a community of sharing |
| 22585 | Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy |
| 22564 | Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things |
| 22565 | The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class |
| 22589 | Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city |
| 22534 | People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own |
| 22538 | Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements |
| 22536 | There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public |
| 22530 | Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence |
| 21047 | Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Sandel] |
| 21358 | Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring |
| 20092 | One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled |
| 2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution |
| 2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong |
| 2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom |
| 22550 | It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share |
| 22568 | Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior |
| 22569 | The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning |
| 2814 | Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education |
| 22540 | Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries |
| 2828 | Law is intelligence without appetite |
| 22537 | Property should be owned privately, but used communally |
| 21044 | For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Sandel] |
| 23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship |
| 2825 | The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense |
| 22527 | Justice is the order in a political community |
| 22547 | Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals |
| 22573 | The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution |
| 2806 | Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice |
| 2816 | If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker |
| 22556 | Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules |
| 22551 | Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues |
| 22554 | It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague |
| 2827 | It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen |
| 5246 | Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance |
| 1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them |
| 2840 | The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods |
| 2811 | A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community |
| 22588 | A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private |
| 2847 | The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult |
| 11150 | It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it |
| 3037 | Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Diog. Laertius] |
| 5150 | Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit |
| 2842 | Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening |
| 11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct |
| 2844 | Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation |
| 5228 | A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed |
| 5092 | Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first |
| 5113 | Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order |
| 5085 | 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter |
| 1740 | Nature does nothing in vain |
| 632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? |
| 5089 | Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? |
| 394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain |
| 396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity |
| 2809 | If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man |
| 626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose |
| 5086 | The nature of a thing is its end and purpose |
| 5087 | A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends |
| 5091 | Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose |
| 2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin] |
| 5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end |
| 5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end |
| 2800 | The best instruments have one purpose, not many |
| 5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity |
| 5108 | Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? |
| 5873 | Each thing's function is its end |
| 17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers |
| 5095 | The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end |
| 5093 | Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible |
| 8660 | There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Friend] |
| 16762 | Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty |
| 13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form |
| 17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold |
| 12058 | Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Wiggins] |
| 10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) |
| 16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category |
| 12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Kung] |
| 601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites |
| 12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Fine,K] |
| 15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity |
| 12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons] |
| 15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Alexander,P] |
| 16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Gill,ML] |
| 13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time |
| 616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? |
| 17464 | When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
| 16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Gill,ML] |
| 17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else |
| 16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible |
| 13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry |
| 16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Gill,ML] |
| 13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? |
| 13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible |
| 13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? |
| 10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity |
| 12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily |
| 11252 | The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Politis] |
| 11253 | A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Politis] |
| 13107 | Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally |
| 5219 | Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency |
| 8332 | The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end |
| 561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? |
| 5861 | People assume events cause what follows them |
| 588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise |
| 634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement |
| 14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows |
| 11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black |
| 9787 | Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study |
| 20063 | Motion fulfils potentiality |
| 5114 | If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? |
| 5116 | When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious |
| 399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? |
| 24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) |
| 24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth |
| 1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement |
| 1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts |
| 24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back |
| 1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round |
| 20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place |
| 5099 | The universe as a whole is not anywhere |
| 5097 | If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place |
| 5098 | Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body |
| 20920 | If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times |
| 13228 | There is no time without movement |
| 5106 | Would there be time if there were no mind? |
| 22967 | It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul |
| 5104 | Time is an aspect of change |
| 8590 | Time does not exist without change |
| 22965 | Time measures rest, as well as change |
| 22885 | For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Bardon] |
| 22959 | Time is not change, but the number we associate with change |
| 22964 | Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure |
| 1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary |
| 22956 | How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? |
| 5102 | If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist |
| 5103 | Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed |
| 22961 | The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time |
| 22916 | Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Le Poidevin] |
| 617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed |
| 16693 | Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows |
| 22958 | Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line |
| 22968 | Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere |
| 22963 | We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined |
| 22966 | The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) |
| 22957 | We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things |
| 402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon |
| 403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible |
| 5083 | Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. |
| 16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? |
| 1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end |
| 620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good |
| 613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes |
| 619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover |
| 395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one |
| 23302 | Plants have far less life than animals, but more life than other corporeal entities |
| 24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away |
| 23301 | There is a gradual proceeding from the inanimate to animals, with no clear borderlines |
| 5119 | The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude |
| 2836 | God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature |
| 622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude |
| 7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Armstrong,K] |
| 16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Frede,M] |
| 13227 | Being is better than not-being |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists |
| 1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence |
| 13226 | An Order controls all things |
| 610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate |
| 2802 | Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle |
| 22729 | The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars |
| 24037 | We all assume immortality is impossible |