| 5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic |
| 5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical |
| 7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics |
| 5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration |
| 5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past |
| 4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates |
| 5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological |
| 6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual |
| 5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless |
| 6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' |
| 5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents |
| 8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 |
| 2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data |
| 5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things |
| 2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction |
| 5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology |
| 6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions |
| 2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables |
| 5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge |
| 4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic |
| 5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses |
| 5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage |
| 5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience |
| 5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively |
| 5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past |
| 5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular |
| 5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival |
| 5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness |
| 5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects |
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements |
| 5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body |
| 5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them |
| 5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! |
| 5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition |
| 5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences |
| 5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions |
| 5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it |
| 5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement |
| 5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition |
| 5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences |
| 6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort |
| 6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by |
| 6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct |
| 6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy |
| 5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions |
| 6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval |
| 5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval |
| 6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them |
| 6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern |
| 5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions |
| 15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity |
| 5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. |
| 5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists |
| 5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. |
| 5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant |