Ideas of M.R. Ayers, by Theme

[British, fl. 1975, Professor at Oxford University, and fellow of Wadham College.]

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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / p. Counting
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identites need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?