Ideas of José A. Benardete, by Theme

[American, fl. 1992, Taught at Syracuse University.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism
     Full Idea: In contemporary metaphysics the major areas of discussion are Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], After)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier)
     Full Idea: At least since Russell, one has routinely distinguished between the 'is' of predication ('Socrates is wise', Fx), the 'is' of identity ('Morning Star is Evening Star', =), and the 'is' of existence ('the cat is under the bed', Ex).
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 7)
     A reaction: This seems horribly nitpicking to many people, but I love it - because it is just true, and it is a truth right at the basis of the confusions in our talk. Analytic philosophy forever! [P.S. 'Tiddles is a cat' - the 'is' membership]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results
     Full Idea: Analytical philosophy excels in the piecemeal analysis of causation, perception, knowledge and so on, but there is a striking poverty of any synoptic vision of these independent studies.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22)
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not?
     Full Idea: As our bible, the Book of Science is presumed to contain only true sentences, but it is less clear how they are to be construed, which literally and which non-literally.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics
     Full Idea: Set theory offers the promise of a complete mathematization of the 'is' of predication.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13)
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it
     Full Idea: Set inclusion is sharply distinguished from set membership (as the set of Greeks is found to be included in, but not a member of, the set of men).
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms
     Full Idea: Zermelo proposed seven axioms for set theory, with Fraenkel adding others, to produce the standard Z-F Intuition.
     From: report of José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) by PG - Db (ideas)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic
     Full Idea: The Greeks saw the independent science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.15)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations
     Full Idea: The Negative numbers are postulated (magic word) to solve x=5-8, Rationals postulated to solve 2x=3, Irrationals for x-squared=2, and Imaginaries for x-squared=-1. (…and Zero for x=5-5) …and x/0 remains eternally open.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.14)
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory)
     Full Idea: One approaches the natural numbers in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory).
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist
     Full Idea: Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns
     Full Idea: With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them?
     Full Idea: How can you learn of the existence of transcendent Platonic objects if there is no causal interaction with them?
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones?
     Full Idea: Why suppose these particles packed together constitute a macro-entity (namely, Mt Everest), whereas those, of equal number, scattered around, fail to add up to anything beyond themselves?
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 2)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist?
     Full Idea: Is being a horse an essential property of a horse? Can we so much as conceive the abstract possibility of a horse's ceasing to be a horse even while continuing to exist?
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.20)
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow?
     Full Idea: If a soldier need not cease to exist merely because he ceases to be a soldier, there is room to doubt that the wind ceases to exist when it ceases to be a wind.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water
     Full Idea: One can step into the same river twice, but one must not expect to step into the same water.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.21)
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself?
     Full Idea: With the thesis that to be as such is to be relative, the absolutist may be found to concur, but the issue turns on what it might be that a thing is supposed to be relative to. Why not itself?
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 8)
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent
     Full Idea: 'Existence' can't be glossed as self-identical (critics say) because Pegasus, even while being self-identical, fails to exist.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.11)
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction
     Full Idea: One proves non-existence (e.g. of round squares) by using logic to derive a contradiction from the concept; it is precisely here, in such proofs, that we find the clearest example of a priori knowledge.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4)
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects
     Full Idea: Assume that we know to be true propositions of the form 'There are exactly x prime numbers between y and z', and synthetic a priori truths about Platonic objects are delivered to us on a silver platter.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori'
     Full Idea: Logical positivism has been concisely summarised as 'there is no synthetic a priori'.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic
     Full Idea: No one thinks that the proposition that something exists that transcends all possible experience harbours a logical inconsistency. Its denial cannot therefore be an analytic proposition, so it must be synthetic, though only knowable on a priori grounds.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge
     Full Idea: Appeals to intuition - no matter how informal - can hardly fail to smack of the synthetic a priori.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions
     Full Idea: Rationalists have been happier with an ontology of points, and empiricists with an ontology of regions.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.16)
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God'
     Full Idea: In the ontological argument a deep enough understanding of the very concept of God allows one to derive by logic a contradiction from the statement 'There is no God'.
     From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4)