9921 | 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' |

9924 | Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility |

9933 | The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set |

9928 | Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates |

9926 | A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets |

9932 | The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory |

9923 | We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers |

9925 | Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together |

9934 | Number words became nouns around the time of Plato |

9918 | Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree |

9929 | Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' |

9927 | Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction |

9930 | Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas |

9919 | The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities |

9922 | If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity |