Ideas of Chrysippus, by Theme

[Greek, 280 - 207 BCE, Born at Soli in Cilicia. A pupil of Arcesilaus. Head of the Stoic school in Athens.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Plutarch]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus have five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Cicero]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 7. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Tieleman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Philo of Alexandria]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Long/Sedley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Sext.Empiricus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Diog. Laertius]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Plutarch]
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Plutarch]
24. Applied Ethics / A. Decision Conflicts / 5. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing
24. Applied Ethics / B. Moral Rights / 3. Animal Rights
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Diog. Laertius]
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Diog. Laertius]
25. Society / A. State of Nature / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Diog. Laertius]
25. Society / D. Political Doctrines / 3. Anarchism
Diogenes masturbated in public, wishing he could get rid of hunger so easily [Plutarch]
25. Society / E. State Functions / 1. The Law / b. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ancient elements
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Stobaeus]
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / f. Presentism
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Plutarch]
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Stobaeus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Diog. Laertius]
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body