Ideas of Earl Conee, by Theme
[American, fl. 2004, Professor at the University of Rochester.]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
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19520
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Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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19522
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More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable
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19521
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If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
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19523
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Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
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19555
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People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
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19557
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Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge
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19556
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Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards
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12890
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That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements
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12892
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Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge
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