Ideas of Daniel C. Dennett, by Theme

[American, b.1942, Pupil of Gilbert Ryle at Oxford. Professor at Tufts University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly

3798	An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

3801	Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

14308

We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Mumford]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

7384	Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary

2526	Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable

3802	Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

7374	Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique

2523	That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification

3795	Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

7369	Brains are essentially anticipation machines

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind

4608	Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Heil]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness

7393	We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious

7367	Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.

4880	Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons

2528	Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness

2525	Maybe language is crucial to consciousness

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

7394	Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy

7391	We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

3158	Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it

2527	Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

6624	Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Lowe]

4873	What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

7387	"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states

7658	Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia

7376	We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight

7372	In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special

7373	Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents

3797	I am the sum total of what I directly control

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

7385	People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness

4881	Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires)

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller

7383	The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

7386	Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self

7381	We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are

7382	We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self

7370	The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits

7655	The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will

3800	You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [PG]

3803	Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own?

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will

3791	Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world

3794	Foreknowledge permits control

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism

7379	If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique

7365	Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up

17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance

3159	Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques

3796	The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations

3161	If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey]

3986	The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

2530	Could a robot be made conscious just by software?

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism

7371	All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another

4875	We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

4879	There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

7657	Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

7366	It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious

7380	Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing

4876	Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind

7656	I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

4878	The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

3177	You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology

3987	Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

4874	The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas

2524	A language of thought doesn't explain content

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence

7654	What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry

18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content

23803

States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Schulte]

18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics

3984	The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic

4882	Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language

2529	Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees)

25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles

3983	Learning is evolution in the brain

25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion

4872	Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes

7368	Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology

3985	Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life

4877	Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster?

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution

3804	Darwin's idea was the best idea ever