14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature |
12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [McFetridge] |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake |
14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments |
14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% |
13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts |
14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind |
14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens |
14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! |
14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism |
14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics |
14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true |
13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions |
13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B |
14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF |
14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? |
13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition |
14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A |
14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe |
14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? |