Ideas of Douglas Edwards, by Theme

[British, fl. 2014, Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen.]

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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification
     Full Idea: Three main reasons for thinking properties exist: the one-over-many argument (that a type can have many tokens), the reference argument (to understand predicates and singular terms), and the quantification argument (that we quantify over them).
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 1.1)
     A reaction: [Bits in brackets are compressions of his explanations]. I don't find any of these remotely persuasive. Why would we infer how the world is, simply from how we talk about or reason about the world? His first reason is the only interesting one.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable
     Full Idea: The Quinean claims that the application of a predicate cannot, in principle, be explained - it is a 'primitive' fact.
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 4.4)
     A reaction: I am not clear what 'principle' could endorse this claim. There just seems to be a possible failure of all the usual attempts at explaining predication.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson'
     Full Idea: For resemblance nominalism the sentence 'the rose is crimson' commits us to at least one other entity that the rose resembles in order for it to be crimson.
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.5.2)
     A reaction: If the theory really needs this, then it has just sunk without trace. It can't suddenly cease to be crimson when the last resembling entity disappears.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support
     Full Idea: The view of 'priority monism' - that the whole is prior to its parts - is controversial, but has been growing in support
     From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.4.4)
     A reaction: The simple and plausible thought is, I take it, that parts only count as parts when a whole comes into existence, so a whole is needed to generate parts. Thus the whole must be prior to the parts. Fine by me.