Ideas of Pascal Engel, by Theme

[French, fl. 2002, Taught at the Sorbonne, Paris.]

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions

4739	In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers

4737	Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances?

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts

4750	The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

4744	We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

4738	The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique

4745	Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth

4755	Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons

4753	Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth

4751	Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence

4752	Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p')

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs

4762	The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs

4754	Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs

4763	'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism

4746	Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs

4764	We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

4759	Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties