Ideas of John Etchemendy, by Theme

[American, b.1952, Professor and Provost of Stanford University.]

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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow
     Full Idea: The difference between (a) snow is white, and (b) 'snow is white' true is that the first makes a claim that only depends on the colour of snow, while the second depends both on the colour of snow and the meaning of the sentence 'snow is white'.
     From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.61), quoted by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.7
     A reaction: This is a helpful first step for those who have reached screaming point by being continually offered this apparently vacuous equivalence. This sentence works well if that stuff is a particular colour.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language
     Full Idea: Getting from a Tarskian definition of truth to a substantive account of the semantic properties of the object language may involve as little as the reintroduction of a primitive notion of truth.
     From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.60), quoted by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1
     A reaction: This is, I think, the first stage in modern developments of axiomatic truth theories. The first problem would be to make sure you haven't reintroduced the Liar Paradox. You need axioms to give behaviour to the 'true' predicate.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations
     Full Idea: In Etchemendy's Interpretational Semantics (perhaps better called 'Substitutional') we keep the situation fixed and vary the interpretation; in Representational Semantics ('Modal'?) we keep interpretations fixed but consider varying situations.
     From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval'
     A reaction: [compressed] These are semantic strategies for interpreting logic, so they are two ways you might go about assessing an argument.
Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion
     Full Idea: The Representational account of validity says an argument is valid if there is no situation where the premises are true and the conclusion false. The Interpretation account says the premises are true and conclusion false under no interpretations.
     From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval'
     A reaction: My immediate instinct is to want logic to be about situations, rather than interpretations. Situations are more about thought, where interpretations are more about language. I think our account of logic should have some applicability to animals.