9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view |

10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others |

10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific |

13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation |

10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions |

10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions |

9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things |

10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q |

10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model |

10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers |

9226 | If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter |

8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers |

18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers |

18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space |

8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities |

18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions |

10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth |

18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space |

9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets |

18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises |

18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements |

18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful |

8714 | Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true |

18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? |

18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic |

8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science |

18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical |

9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible |

9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence |

9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes |

9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that |

9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' |

9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori |

18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation |

10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism |

9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract |

7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects |

18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents |

18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive |

18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously |

8404 | Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected |

8402 | The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality |

8401 | Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation |

8400 | Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones |