Ideas of Kit Fine, by Theme

[British, b.1946, Professor at New York University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
14255 We understand things through their dependency relations
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14250 Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
17275 Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
9766 Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
10571 Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
10528 Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
9143 Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Cook/Ebert]
10143 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
12302 Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals
14259 Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
14266 Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same
11178 The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15063 Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
17283 If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
9560 S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
14263 Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10565 There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10564 We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
23548 Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
17286 Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9775 Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
12220 Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form?
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11175 Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
9148 I think of variables as objects rather than as signs
15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values
15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals
15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that
15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't
15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts
15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
14620 Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11176 The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
12222 Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10569 If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10570 Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience
23539 Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9771 Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language
11174 A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
10573 Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
10575 Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
10574 Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
12215 The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10529 If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth
10530 Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
10560 Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
12211 It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced'
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
12209 The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
10568 Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
9224 Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
9222 The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction
9223 My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
12214 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin'
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15078 There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14253 An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
10145 Abstracts cannot be identified with sets
10136 Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction
10144 Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth
12212 Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12216 Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality
12218 Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Sider]
14262 Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties
17272 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing
17276 If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality
17284 An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy
17285 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways
17288 We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences
17280 Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates
17281 If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
14268 Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence
17274 Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science)
17290 Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17278 We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object
14251 A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does
14254 Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another
14257 An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition
14261 There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9210 Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10563 A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12217 For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground'
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental'
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real?
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither
9211 A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23544 Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range
23540 Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction
23546 Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9768 Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
9776 A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9773 With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work
9774 Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision
9767 A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise
9770 Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values
9772 Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision)
23541 Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man'
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12213 Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
14217 The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order
14216 The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order
14218 A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath'
14220 Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased?
14219 Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
16755 The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202 Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
15075 Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14252 We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9769 Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers
23545 We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11177 Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11173 Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is'
15065 What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa
16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Lowe]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold
9206 We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Rami]
15076 Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
12295 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location
12298 Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
12296 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location
18882 You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
12297 Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant
17279 Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15073 Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15074 We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9205 The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
9209 Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances'
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
15064 Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9200 Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
9212 Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs!
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity
9216 Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity
14530 The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
17289 Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something
17273 Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects
15070 It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
9213 The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been'
15068 The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities
15069 Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
9214 Unsupported testimony may still be believable
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17271 Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination?
17291 We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
9152 If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
23547 It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
17277 If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa)
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9144 Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Cook/Ebert]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9149 To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects
9150 We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case
10141 Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10135 We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction)
9142 Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Cook/Ebert]
10137 Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory
10138 An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts
10561 Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object
10562 We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements
10567 We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts
10527 An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9146 After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist!
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic)
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!)
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference
14618 Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth
14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14622 Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
9207 If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content!
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man'
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
14265 The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
23543 We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9215 Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
15067 A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction
15077 It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
15066 B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time